瑜伽師地論略纂 3.33

3.33

別破分二：初五段破；後例往過去，後三合例業用破故。　第一難有三：一、有方所；二、與現在無別；三、應是常。初難，量云：未來應有方所，有來至故，猶如現在。又未來應與現在無別，有來至故，有方所故，猶如現在。又未來法體應是常，本今有故，如虛空等。五十一云：未來諸法不來至現在，無方處故，猶善無為。　第二難有二：一、未來不生於今，現在本無今生。量云：未來世法應非有為，本不生故，如虛空等；亦非實有，非是無為，本不生故，如兔角等。二、未來未生，而言死沒。量云：未來諸法應無死沒，本未生故，如虛空等。又未來法亦應有生，許有死故，猶如現在。　第三難有二：一、破應是常。量云：住未來世為緣之法應是常住，不遷流故，如無為等。二、應本無今生，非未來法生。此違宗難。彼說未來法流入現在，今現在法未來緣生，未來先無，今方始生，非未來法生，豈不違宗？　第四破業用有三：一、本無業用，今有業用。難云：是即本有其體，今方有用，便有同前緣生之中第二過失，現在業生非從未來生故。用不離體，應非新有；體不離用，應非舊成。為量同前。　二云：業用與法有異相。難云：此業用相與其本法二俱體有，業未來無，故不應理。量云：業用未來應有，許一切有故，如體。體未來應無，許一切有故，如業用。或以異相為因，體與業用互相異故，宗、喻同前。　三云：業與本法無異相。難云：業用則法，法體本有，本無業用，今方有者，不應正理。量云：業應本有，即體故，如體。體應本無，即業故，如業。彼宗計業與體無別，今難異者，乃是設遮。五十一云：佛說諸行非常非恒，汝業無常，行應是常，便違佛教。

The separate refutations have two parts: first, refutations in five sections; second, applying them by analogy to the past, because the latter three are analogously refuted together with activity. The first objection has three points: 1. Having a spatial location; 2. Being non-distinct from the present; 3. Being necessarily permanent. In the first objection, the formal proof is: The future must have a spatial location, because of having arrived, just like the present. Furthermore, the future must be non-distinct from the present, because of having arrived and because of having a spatial location, just like the present. Furthermore, the substance of future phenomena must be permanent, because of existing both originally and now, like space, etc. Fascicle fifty-one states: Future phenomena do not arrive in the present, because of lacking spatial location, just like the unconditioned good. The second objection has two points: 1. The future does not arise in the present; what originally did not exist in the present now arises. The formal proof is: Phenomena of the future period must not be conditioned, because of originally not arising, like space, etc.; nor are they real existents, because of not being unconditioned and originally not arising, like a rabbit's horn, etc. 2. What has not arisen in the future is said to die out. The formal proof is: Future phenomena must have no dying out, because of originally not having arisen, like space, etc. Furthermore, future phenomena must also have arising, because of admitting death, just like the present. The third objection has two points: 1. Refuting that it would be permanent. The formal proof is: Phenomena abiding in the future period that serve as conditions must be permanent, because of not undergoing flux, like the unconditioned, etc. 2. What originally did not exist must now arise, rather than a future phenomenon arising. This is an objection showing contradiction with their own tenet. They say that future phenomena flow into the present; now, present phenomena arise conditioned by the future, which originally did not exist in the future and only now begin to arise—it is not that future phenomena arise, so how does this not contradict their tenet? The fourth objection refuting activity has three points: 1. Originally lacking activity, but now having activity. The objection states: This means that its substance originally exists and only now possesses function, incurring the same second fault as in the previous conditioning, because present activity arises without arising from the future. Function is not separate from substance, so it should not be newly existent; substance is not separate from function, so it should not be previously established. The formal proof is as before. 2. It states: Activity and the phenomenon have distinct characteristics. The objection states: The characteristic of this activity and its original phenomenon both substantially exist, yet activity does not exist in the future, which is therefore unreasonable. The formal proof is: Activity should exist in the future, because of admitting that all exists, like the substance. Substance should not exist in the future, because of admitting that all exists, like activity. Or one may take distinct characteristics as the reason, because substance and activity are mutually distinct; the thesis and example are as before. 3. It states: Activity and the original phenomenon have no distinct characteristics. The objection states: Activity is just the phenomenon; the substance of the phenomenon originally exists, while originally it lacked activity and only now has it, which does not accord with correct reasoning. The formal proof is: Activity should originally exist, because it is identical with the substance, like the substance. Substance should originally not exist, because it is identical with activity, like activity. That school posits that activity and substance are non-distinct; here, objecting to distinctness is merely a hypothetical negation. Fascicle fifty-one states: The Buddha taught that conditioned formations are not permanent and not eternal; if your activity is impermanent, the formations must be permanent, which then contradicts the Buddha's teaching.