成唯識論述記 1.225

1.225

述曰：此破數論：此中第一破初。量云：汝所執我，是宗有法，應不隨身受苦、樂者，是宗之法。此二和合互相差別，不相離性，總名為宗也；一、許常故，二、許遍故，因也；如汝虛空喻也。有二比量，此破僧佉我為受者，文言執我意噵汝執。文言常遍意，亦有許。若不爾者，有法之我，非自極成，常遍之因，亦犯隨一。或若大乘許我是有，即違自宗，若無，即犯自所別過。因中亦有，所依不成，大乘虛空雖無實體，就他宗說，亦得為喻。故無喻中俱不成過，故說汝言。初一執字義通因、喻，許義同故。又於因中應加「故」字，義定順故。又因、喻自許，此則不成，若唯他許，非必是過，他比量故。文中有法在初，法居最後，中間因、喻，隨文可知。性相為文，故無次第，下文體例，或有非次，皆准此知。解因明者，許是事故，應審思准。

The Commentary states: This refutes the Sāṃkhya. Here, the first refutes the first [assertion]. The syllogistic formulation (prayoga) is: "The self posited by you" is the subject (dharmin) of the thesis; "should not experience suffering and pleasure in accordance with the body" is the predicate (sādhya-dharma) of the thesis. The combination of these two, qualifying each other in an inseparable nature, is collectively called the thesis (pakṣa). "Because you admit it to be eternal" and "because you admit it to be all-pervading" are the reasons (hetu). "Like your empty space" is the example (dṛṣṭānta). There are two inferences here. This refutes the Sāṃkhya claim that the self is the experiencer. The text saying "posit that the self" means "what you posit." The text saying "eternal and all-pervading" also implies "admitted [by you]." If it were not so, the self as the subject would not be commonly established (prasiddha) by oneself, and the reason of being eternal and all-pervading would also incur the fault of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha). Or, if the Mahāyāna were to admit that the self exists, it would contradict its own school's tenets; if nonexistent, it would commit the fallacy of the subject being nonexistent for oneself (āśrayāsiddha). In the reason, there would also be āśrayāsiddha. Although empty space has no real substantial entity in Mahāyāna, when spoken of in accordance with the other school's doctrine, it can still serve as an example; thus it is free from the fallacy in the example of both sides failing to establish it (ubhaya-asiddha). Therefore, the word "your" is stated. The first word "posit" applies both to the reason and the example, because the meaning of "admitting" is the same. Furthermore, the word "because" should be added to the reason, so that the meaning is definitively coherent. Moreover, if the reason and example are only admitted by oneself, they are unestablished; if admitted only by the other party, it is not necessarily a fallacy, because it is an inference directed against the other (para-anumāna). In the text, the subject is at the beginning and the predicate is at the end, while the reason and example in the middle can be known from the text. Because the text presents the nature and characteristics directly, it lacks formal syllogistic order; in the stylistic patterns below, there may also be non-sequential phrasing, all of which should be understood by analogy to this. Those who understand hetuvidyā admit that this is the case, so one should consider and weigh it carefully.