成唯識論述記 1.234

1.234

述曰：下破有情我體各異，諸有情我既更相遍，體應相雜，由彼計執諸有情我體是實，有各各調然，自相別故。量云：諸有情我與天授我，體應是一；許常、遍故；如天授我。論言相雜，意令相入，成一物故。雖言更遍，意言常遍，不爾更雜，便無同喻。外返難言，且如同處不相離色，許多種色更互相遍，體非相雜，諸根得時，各各異故。其我亦然，雖體相遍，然非相雜，各有屬故，斯有何失？此亦不然，彼執我體是真，是實，有相雜失。然我色等，是虛幻法，又同類業，招非實之法，體相虛疎，設令相雜，亦無過失。一切有情共果亦爾，其山河等同一處故，又今以彼更相遍言，遂令相雜，以成一物，未必須量。

The Commentary states: Below is the refutation of the position that the substances of the selves of sentient beings are each distinct. If the selves of all sentient beings mutually pervade one another, their substances should be intermingled. This is because they posit that the substances of the selves of all sentient beings are real, exist distinctly, and each have separate individual marks. The inference is: The selves of all sentient beings and the self of Devadatta should be one in substance; because they are admitted to be permanent and all-pervading; like the self of Devadatta. When the Treatise says 'intermingled', it means that they enter into one another to become a single thing. Although it says 'mutually pervade', the meaning is 'permanently and universally pervade'; if not, and it only meant 'mutually intermingle', there would be no homologous example. The outsider counters by arguing: Just like colors that occupy the same place without mutual exclusion, many kinds of color mutually pervade one another, yet their substances are not intermingled, because when the sense organs grasp them, each is distinct. The selves are also like this: although their substances mutually pervade, they are not intermingled, because each belongs to its own [individual]; what fault is there in this? This also is incorrect. They hold that the substance of the self is true and real, hence there is the fault of intermingling. But our colors and so forth are illusory dharmas, and dharmas of a similar class that are not real are produced by karma; their substantial marks are insubstantial and sparse, so even granting that they intermingle, there is no fault. The shared fruits of all sentient beings are also like this: mountains, rivers, and the like occupy the same place; furthermore, now relying on their statement of 'mutually pervading', this consequently causes them to intermingle and become one single thing; a formal inference is not strictly necessary.