成唯識論述記 1.306

1.306

述曰：無有一我無作、受用。若數論師無作者，用亦名無用。若動轉作用、勢用作用，勝、數俱無；《十句》說故；離繫子等，我有動轉。故是前門，餘是後門。又諸所計得解脫時，我並無用。無用量云：所執之我，應非實我；無作用故；如兔角等。虛空亦得無作用故，文言非實我，不言非實有，故彼真如非不定失。若爾，寧言常樂我淨？此非定實我，性離言故。言我者，是假說也。此無用計，諸執並非。無有一師計我無用，然破無動作、勢用之用，故得為難。或綺互破作、受之用，謂應量云：僧佉等我，應非實我；無唯作者用故；如虛空等。吠世等我，應非實我；無唯受者用故；如兔角等。此中遮無唯受者用，非許唯有受者用性便為實我。不爾，本識及僧佉我應是實我，但言兔角無唯受者用，不言兔角有作、受用，故此非失，以因明者遮詮門故。文結易知，故不別釋。

The Commentary states: There is no self that lacks agency or experiencership. If according to the Sāṃkhya master there is no agent, its function is also called lack of function. As for bodily motion activity and efficacious activity, neither the Vaiśeṣikas nor the Sāṃkhyas have them, because the Daśapadārthī states this; the Nirgranthas and others hold that the self has bodily motion. Therefore, that is the former category, and the rest are the latter category. Furthermore, according to all their positings, at the time of attaining liberation, their selves are all devoid of activity. The formal inference for lack of activity is: The posited self should not be a real self; because it is devoid of activity; like a rabbit's horn and so on. Empty space can also be devoid of activity, but the text states 'not a real self' and does not state 'not really existent', so tathatā does not cause the fallacy of inconclusiveness. If so, why speak of permanence, bliss, self, and purity? This is not a definitively real self, because its nature is free from conceptual elaboration. Saying 'self' is a nominal designation. All these views regarding a self devoid of activity are incorrect. There is no teacher who posits that the self is devoid of activity, yet refuting the activity of movement and efficacy allows this objection. Or, one can alternately refute the activity of agency and experiencership, meaning one should infer: The self of the Sāṃkhyas and others should not be a real self; because it lacks the function of being solely an agent; like empty space, etc. The self of the Vaiśeṣikas and others should not be a real self; because it lacks the function of being solely an experiencer; like a rabbit's horn, etc. Here, excluding the lack of the function of being solely an experiencer does not mean conceding that possessing the nature of the function of being solely an experiencer constitutes a real self. Otherwise, the fundamental consciousness and the Sāṃkhya self would be real selves; it merely says a rabbit's horn lacks the function of being solely an experiencer, and does not say a rabbit's horn has agency and experiencership, so there is no flaw here, because hetuvidyā proceeds via apoha (exclusion). The concluding text is easy to understand, so it is not separately explained.