成唯識論述記 1.320

1.320

述曰：此下第四，總破前師，不須別說染、淨之惠。但汝所說緣我之見，今皆破之，無相符過。應為量云：汝緣我之見，不緣於實我，宗也；有所緣故，因也；如緣我外色等之心，喻也。文有次第，如是應知。然就彼計，皆有我見，不緣我生，如僧佉說：吠世史迦作者我見，不緣實我生，是橫計故。餘計相望，准知亦爾。故今此宗應有分別汝等，各別言非，橫計緣我之見，方成有法。今大乘意，欲顯但是緣我之見，皆不緣於實我生故，不須分別。此破能緣不緣我起。

The Commentary states: Below this, fourth, is a general refutation of the previous masters, without needing to distinguish defiled and pure insight. We now simply refute in all cases the views that condition a self as asserted by you, without the fault of proving what is already accepted. The syllogism should be formulated thus: The subject is: 'Your views that condition a self'; the thesis predicate is: 'do not condition a real self'; the reason is: 'because they have an intentional object'; the example is: 'just like minds conditioning form and so forth other than a self.' The text proceeds in sequence, and should be understood in this way. However, according to their assertions, there are in all cases views of a self that do not arise by conditioning a self; as the Sāṃkhyas say: the Vaiśeṣikas' view of an agent-self does not arise by conditioning a real self, because it is an arbitrary imputation. The other assertions can be understood correspondingly in relation to one another. Therefore, now in this thesis one would have to make distinctions among you, with each separately stating that it is not [a real self], so that an arbitrary imputation of a view conditioning a self would only then constitute a valid subject. Now the Mahāyāna intent is to show that simply all views conditioning a self do not arise by conditioning a real self; therefore, no distinction is needed. This refutes the apprehending [cognition] as not arising by conditioning a self.