成唯識論述記 1.486

1.486

述曰：此難不生果諸常住者，謂大有、同異、和合、無能、俱分五全是常；空等五實常者，皆不能生果。除無說句，以為喻故。又體是無，非所破故。今以唯識難之，不可以無作用難。真如、虛空為不定過，無作用故。量云：此等實常，不生果者，應非離識實有自性；許是常住，不生果故；如兔角等。彼宗畢竟無是常住故，以為同喻。因不言常，有不定失。或餘句無常者，雖不生果，大乘不許有實體故。設許有體，亦非離識，故無不定。然彼覺等既不離識，應犯相符。今言常住，即除覺等，覺等攝在異喻中故。又不言常，除覺等，以為同品亦得，文中宗等，准理應知。又兔角等，亦非離識，彼此共成。真如、空等，亦不離識，無不定過。

The Commentary states: This presses on those eternal ones that do not produce effects: namely, great existence, generic particularity, inherence, non-potency, and common nature—these five are completely eternal; and the five eternal substances such as space, none of which can produce effects. This excludes the category of non-existence because it is used as an example, and also because its substance is nonexistent, so it is not what is to be refuted. Here, he presses them by means of vijñapti-mātra, and one cannot press them with lack of activity, because tathatā and space would incur the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika), having no activity. The inference states: These substances that are eternal and do not produce effects should not have real self-nature apart from consciousness; because you admit they are eternal and do not produce effects; like a rabbit's horns and the like. Because that school holds that absolute non-existence is eternal, it is taken as the homogeneous example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta). If the reason does not state 'eternal', it would incur the fallacy of inconclusiveness. Or, as for the impermanent ones among the other categories, though they do not produce effects, the Mahāyāna does not accept that they have real substantiality; and even if granted to have substantiality, they are not apart from consciousness, so there is no inconclusiveness. However, since their awareness and so forth are not apart from consciousness, this would commit the fallacy of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). Stating 'eternal' here specifically excludes awareness and the like, because awareness and the like are subsumed in the heterogeneous example. Moreover, if not stating 'eternal', one may also exclude awareness and the like to form the homogeneous class; the thesis and so on in the text should be understood in accordance with reason. Furthermore, a rabbit's horns and the like are also not apart from consciousness, which is mutually established by both parties. Tathatā, space, and so forth are also not apart from consciousness, so there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness.