成唯識論述記 1.517

1.517

述曰：於中有三：一、破大有；二、難同異；三、破和合。初中有四，此即初也。彼計實等有法之外，別計有一大有之性，能有諸法。法若無此，即體非有，如龜毛等。故今破之。彼宗所執大有性者，應離實等八句之外無別自性；汝宗許是非無法故；如實、德等，等取業等。不言八句，有不定過。或但言離三句亦得。其異句等，非兩共成，無不定失。或遮決定相違，說八句勝，非無之因，唯彼許於有性上有故，許言簡，自隨一過。實等許非無，離實等外無別有；有性許非無，應實等外無別有，難令實外無別有性。

The Commentary states: Herein there are three parts: first, refuting great existence; second, challenging generality-particularity; third, refuting inherence (samavāya). Within the first, there are four points, and this is the first. Beyond existing things such as substance, they posit a distinct nature of great existence that can make dharmas exist. If dharmas lack this, their entity is non-existent, like the hair of a tortoise and so forth. Therefore, one now refutes it. The nature of great existence held by that school should have no distinct intrinsic nature outside the eight categories such as substance; because your school accepts that it is not a non-existent dharma; like substance, quality, and so forth—'and so forth' including action and the rest. If one does not say 'the eight categories', there is the fallacy of inconclusiveness. Or it is also permissible to speak merely of being separate from the three categories. Since the category of particularity and so on are not mutually established by both parties, there is no error of inconclusiveness. Alternatively, to preclude decisive contradiction (viruddha-avyabhicārin), stating eight categories is superior. Since the reason 'non-non-existence' is accepted by them alone to reside in the nature of existence, the word 'accepted' qualifies it to avoid the fallacy of being unestablished for oneself (svāprasiddha). Substance and so forth are accepted as not non-existent, yet there is no distinct existence outside substance and so forth; the nature of existence is accepted as not non-existent, so there should be no distinct existence outside substance and so forth—this challenges them so that there is no distinct nature of existence outside substance.