成唯識論述記 1.538

1.538

述曰：難令離實等，無同異性。量云：實等之外，應無同異性；非唯一故；如同異性。如實性等，無別實等性，實等亦應無別實性等。等德等性遮令同異有同異性，其實等性應更有實等性；非一法故；如實等法。實性者，同異性也。然實等各異，義相似，實等之外別立實等性。實等之性相似，亦非一，應更別立實等性。相似之言，簡不相似，此即以性同實等例。若總、若別皆有比量，此中但有總而無別，別數如前。然文唯有以性同實例，無以實同性例，若破六句義即無違，若破十句，有不定失。異、有能等非一相似，無別性故。今者亦以為所立中，應令別有性，例同於實等，亦無過也。又非極成法，無不定失。

The Commentary states: This is a refutation to force the conclusion that apart from substance and the others, no commonality-and-particularity (sāmānya-viśeṣa) exists. The inference states: Outside of substance and the rest, there should be no commonality-and-particularity; because they are not single; just as [their own] commonality-and-particularity. Just as substance-ness and the rest have no separate substance-ness and the rest, substance and the rest should also have no separate substance-ness and the rest. The mention of 'and the rest' [includes] quality-ness and the rest, precluding commonality-and-particularity from possessing another commonality-and-particularity. In fact, substance-ness and the rest ought to possess further substance-ness and the rest; because they are not a single dharma; just like the dharmas of substance and the rest. 'Substance-ness' is commonality-and-particularity. Yet substances and the rest are each distinct, while their definitions are similar; therefore outside of substance and the rest, they separately posit substance-ness and the rest. Since the natures of substance and the rest are also similar and not single, one ought to posit further natures of substance and the rest. The word 'similar' excludes what is dissimilar; this uses the nature [of substance] to parallel substance and the others. Whether taken comprehensively or individually, all have inferences; here there is only the comprehensive and not the individual, whose individual numbers are as before. However, the text only draws the parallel using the nature to conform to substance, not using substance to conform to the nature. If refuting the six categories (padārtha), there is no contradiction; but if refuting the ten categories, there would be the fault of indeterminacy (anaikāntika). This is because particularity (viśeṣa), potentiality (sāmarthya), and so on are multiple and similar, yet lack separate natures. Now, in what is to be established (sādhya), one would also force them to have separate natures, drawing a parallel to substance and the rest; thus there is no fault either. Moreover, since they are not well-established dharmas (prasiddha), there is no fault of indeterminacy.