成唯識論述記 1.552

1.552

述曰：自下第五，總破六句。然彼計無，非離識有，故但破九。初破實等離識自體竟不可得；次破緣實等智，非是緣實等現量智。初比量云：彼計實等，是有法也，非是緣離識實有自體之現量所得，是法也——合名為宗；汝許是所知故；如龜毛等。此無異喻。彼宗計此實、德等句是緣識外實有自體，現量所得，故今非之。現量者，能緣也，此中遮非是緣離識外境，自體現量智之所得；非是緣不離識境，假有自體現量所得。義雖是緣不離識境心等所得，非必現量所得故。其實等句義，彼宗說是離識有體，能緣彼心，是名現量。彼實等句是此現量所得。謂實等句義，是離識實有自體之現量所得。今者非之。復言緣者，恐濫持業釋，言其離識實有自體，即是現量。若以離識實有自體屬其能緣現量者，即彼、此二宗一切心、心所法亦非離識實有自體，覺等即是心、心所故，犯違宗過。為簡此過，故說緣言，顯依士釋。緣顯能緣，非離識有體實等句義之現量得。又若不言緣，即無所簡，其覺、樂等亦入法中，即有一分相符之失，彼亦說為不離識，現量得故。由此應合實等句，義總為二分，謂彼覺等心、心所法總為一分，除此以外法為一分；其能緣法總為三分：一、唯緣實等非心、心所法；二、唯緣覺等心、心所法；三、合二為境，若論說言。然彼實等非唯緣離識實有自體現量所得，為簡德中覺等不離心故，恐犯違宗及相符故。說「唯」字者，簡別緣實等。可置「唯」字通緣二者，即簡不盡。以覺、樂等亦從實等，是離識實有自體，現量所得。實等亦從覺等，是不離識，實有自體，現量得故。今為簡盡，但應總言：非緣離識等。其總緣者，亦所簡故，為簡如是種種過失，故但說緣，不言「唯」等。此中總為但有一量，准能緣智各別有九比量，若二二、三三合，義准應知。

The Commentary states: From here is the fifth [section], a comprehensive refutation of the six categories. But since their posited non-existence is not held to exist apart from consciousness, only nine are refuted. First, it refutes the claim that the intrinsic nature of substance and the rest apart from consciousness can ever be apprehended; next, it refutes the claim that the cognition grasping substance and the rest is direct perceptual cognition grasping substance and the rest. The first inference states: The substance and the rest posited by them—this is the subject (dharmin)—are not apprehended by direct perception grasping a real intrinsic nature apart from consciousness—this is the property (dharma)—which together form the thesis (pakṣa); because you accept that they are knowable (jñeya); like turtle hair and the like. This lacks a dissimilar example (vipakṣa). That school holds that these categories of substance, quality, and the rest grasp a real intrinsic nature external to consciousness and are apprehended by direct perception; therefore it is now negated. 'Direct perception' refers to the cognizing subject; here it precludes being apprehended by a direct perceptual cognition whose intrinsic nature grasps an external object apart from consciousness; it does not preclude being apprehended by direct perception whose conventionally existent intrinsic nature grasps an object not apart from consciousness. For although in meaning they are apprehended by the mind and so on that grasp an object not apart from consciousness, they are not necessarily apprehended by direct perception. Their categories of substance and the rest are stated by that school to have entities apart from consciousness, and the mind cognizing them is termed direct perception. Their categories of substance and the rest are apprehended by this direct perception. That is to say, the categories of substance and the rest are apprehended by direct perception grasping a real intrinsic nature apart from consciousness. Now this is negated. Furthermore, 'grasping' (pratyaya/ālambana) is stated for fear of confusing it with a karmadhāraya compound that would say the real intrinsic nature apart from consciousness is itself direct perception. If the real intrinsic nature apart from consciousness were attributed to the cognizing direct perception, then for both their school and ours, all minds and mental factors would also not be real intrinsic natures apart from consciousness, since intellect (buddhi) and so on are precisely minds and mental factors; hence one would commit the fault of contradicting one's own tenet. To qualify and avoid this fault, the word 'grasping' is stated, showing a tatpuruṣa compound. 'Grasping' reveals the cognizing subject, [meaning] they are not apprehended by direct perception of categories of substance and the rest having entities apart from consciousness. Moreover, if one did not say 'grasping,' there would be no qualification, and intellect, pleasure, and the like would also enter into the predicate (dharma), resulting in the fault of partial acceptance (aṃśatasiddha/siddhasādhana), since they too state that these are not apart from consciousness and are apprehended by direct perception. Because of this, the categories of substance and the rest should be combined into two parts: that is, their minds and mental factors such as intellect and the like form one part, and the dharmas other than these form the other part. The cognizing dharmas are divided into three parts: first, those solely grasping non-minds and non-mental factors such as substance; second, those solely grasping minds and mental factors such as intellect; third, those combining both as object. If the treatise states: 'However, those substances and the rest are not apprehended solely by direct perception grasping a real intrinsic nature apart from consciousness'—this is to qualify intellect and the rest among qualities as not being apart from mind, fearing the faults of contradicting tenets and partial acceptance. Stating the word 'solely' is to exclude those that cognize substance and the rest individually. But if one were to place the word 'solely' to apply to those that grasp both, the qualification would not be exhaustive. For intellect, pleasure, and the like also follow substance and the rest, being apprehended by direct perception of real intrinsic natures apart from consciousness; while substance and the rest also follow intellect and the like, being apprehended by direct perception of real intrinsic natures not apart from consciousness. Now to make the qualification exhaustive, one should simply say comprehensively: 'are not [apprehended by direct perception] grasping [a real intrinsic nature] apart from consciousness, etc.' Those that comprehensively grasp them are also excluded; thus to avoid such various faults, it merely says 'grasping' and does not say 'solely' and so forth. Here in total there is only one inference; based on the cognizing cognitions, there are individually nine inferences; if taken in pairs, triplets, and so on, this should be understood accordingly.