成唯識論述記 1.554

1.554

述曰：第二，量云：緣實之智，非緣離識實句，自體現量智攝；假合生故；如德智等。彼計緣實智生之時，假合生者，謂緣九實及大有及異，隨所有德，同異等實性，發生此智。然德智等，皆假合生，亦緣多法，假合生故，即非緣實，現量智攝。緣實之智亦假合生，應非緣實現量之智。若作此解，無獨緣德等智可以為喻，必合緣故。有及和合等，必有所有及所合故，不作此解。緣大有、和合之智，非假合生，由是理故，今更解。先假合生者，顯藉多法，藉因託緣，智方生故。謂如意緣實時，藉我及合德、法、非法、行等因緣方生。緣於實句，其德、智亦爾。有及和合亦爾，許有別緣有及和合以為境者。然不要與實、德等境合，方能緣之，以能緣智藉多法起，名假合生，無過失也。前解境必有多，方能生智；後解境可唯一，藉多緣生，名假合生。彼家所計緣實之智，即是緣於離識之外實之現量，今正非之。此智非是緣離識之實現量智義也。

The Commentary states: The second inference states: The cognition grasping substance is not subsumed under direct perceptual cognition whose intrinsic nature grasps the category of substance apart from consciousness; because it arises from a composite (sāmagrī); like the cognition of quality and the like. In their system, when the cognition grasping substance arises, 'arising from a composite' means that grasping the nine substances, great being, and particularity, along with whatever qualities, commonality-and-particularity, and other substance-nesses exist, it gives rise to this cognition. But the cognition of quality and the rest all arise from composites, and because they also grasp multiple dharmas and arise from composites, they are not subsumed under direct perceptual cognition grasping substance. Since the cognition grasping substance also arises from a composite, it should not be a direct perceptual cognition grasping substance. If interpreted in this way, there would be no cognition grasping quality alone that could serve as an example, because it must grasp a composite. Being, inherence, and the rest necessarily have their possessors and that which is inhered in; therefore this interpretation is not adopted. Cognition grasping great being and inherence does not arise from a composite; for this reason, it is now explained otherwise. That 'arising from a composite' previously stated shows that it relies on multiple dharmas, and only by relying on causes and conditions does the cognition arise. That is to say, when the mental organ (manas) grasps substance, it arises only by relying on causes and conditions such as the self, the quality of conjunction, dharma, adharma, and mental impressions (saṃskāra). When grasping the category of substance, its cognition of quality is also like this. Being and inherence are also like this, accepting that there are those that separately grasp being and inherence as objects. Yet it is not required to conjoin with objects such as substance and quality before being able to grasp them; because the cognizing cognition arises dependent on multiple dharmas, it is termed 'arising from a composite,' and there is no fault. The former explanation required the object necessarily to be multiple before it could produce cognition; the latter explanation allows the object to be single, yet because it arises dependent on multiple conditions, it is termed 'arising from a composite.' The cognition grasping substance posited by that school is precisely the direct perception grasping substance outside and apart from consciousness; now it is directly negated. The meaning is that this cognition is not a direct perceptual cognition grasping substance apart from consciousness.