成唯識論述記 1.601

1.601

上來初有方分難父母實有；次無方分難能生麁色；後能生果難父母常。總破能生父母本極微竟。下破所生果，於中有二：無常極成，故不須破。次下第一，難所生之果，不麁於因量。至下文言既多分成，應非實有，第二方是難果實有。初中有四：一、合破順世、勝論本計果量同一因微；第二，量德合下，唯破衛世麁德合救；第三，合破順世、衛世遍在自因之救義執；第四，合破順世、衛世果多分合故成麁救。

In the preceding text, first, by means of [the challenge regarding having] spatial parts, the substantial existence of the parent [atoms] was refuted; next, by means of [the challenge regarding having] no spatial parts, their ability to produce coarse matter was refuted; and finally, by means of [the challenge regarding] the ability to produce an effect, the permanence of the parent [atoms] was refuted. The overall refutation of the productive parent original atoms is thus concluded. Below, the produced effects are refuted, which contains two parts: that [effects] are impermanent is already established by consensus and therefore needs no refutation. Next, the first part challenges that the produced effect is not coarser than the size of its cause. Reaching the subsequent text stating, "Since it is composed of multiple parts, it should not be substantially existent," this second part is properly the challenge to the substantial existence of the effect. Within the first part, there are four points: first, a joint refutation of the original thesis of the Lokāyata and Vaiśeṣika that the size of the effect is identical to that of a single causal atom; second, beginning with "inhering in the quality of magnitude," a refutation solely of the Vaiśeṣika's defensive position concerning the inherence of the quality of coarseness; third, a joint refutation of the defensive position held by both the Lokāyata and Vaiśeṣika that [the effect] pervades its own causes; fourth, a joint refutation of the defensive position of both the Lokāyata and Vaiśeṣika that [an effect] becomes coarse because many parts combine.