成唯識論述記 1.630

1.630

述曰：此中《二十論》言：「一應無次行，俱時至未至，及多有間事，并難見細物。」破衛世計，今亦同之。果色是一，如得此一處、一分時，一切處、一切分亦應得，以彼、此一故，彼應如此。論雖為比量，但舉一邊，亦應言：此應如彼。大乘以理，無實一物，乃至一極微，亦無實一，是假立故，無不定失。今破實一也。

The Commentary states: In this regard, the Viṃśikā states: "One [single whole] would preclude sequential locomotion, simultaneous reaching and not reaching, multiple detached events, and subtle objects difficult to see." Refuting the Vaiśeṣika thesis there applies equally here. If the material effect is one, just as when reaching this one place or one part, all places and all parts should also be reached, because 'that' and 'this' are one; therefore 'that should be like this.' Although the treatise formulates the syllogism presenting only one side, one should also say: 'this should be like that.' In the Mahāyāna, according to reason, there is no substantially real single entity; even a single atom is not substantially one, being nominally designated, so there is no fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). Here it refutes a real unity.