成唯識論述記 10.194

10.194

述曰：由此《對法》第七等，問：從何而得斷耶？答：不從過去，已滅故；不從未來，未生故；不從現在，道不俱故，然從諸煩惱麁重而得斷，為斷如是如是品麁重，生如是如是品對治。若此品對治生，此品麁重滅，猶如世間明生闇滅，由此品離繫故，令未來煩惱住不生法中，是名為斷，故非道惑可說為俱。問：此言斷者，為斷緣縛？為斷相應縛？答：若所知障，唯言斷麁重，體非縛法故；若煩惱障，從二說斷。五十九說，對治道生，煩惱不起，得無生法，是故說名斷彼相應。相應斷已不復緣境，故從所緣亦說名斷。言麁重斷，雖亦通煩惱障，然從二斷唯煩惱中。又，所知障種，障十地智，是染污性，善薩斷時，斷彼種體，如二乘者斷煩惱種。然二乘斷定障等時，但斷麁重令相隨順，不能斷種，不同菩薩。問：此言斷者，為總緣智能斷？為別緣智能斷？此有何失？總緣之智非自相智，如何共相比量之智能斷惑耶？若別相智能斷，即違《對法》、五十九等文。《對法》七等說：「問：何等作意能斷耶？答：總緣作意，觀一切法皆無我性能斷煩惱」。師子覺云：「總緣作意者，合緣一切法共相行作意」。答：如《佛地》第六說：云何佛能知共相？共相既依比量而立，豈佛知共相是比量耶？彼有三說：有義：二量是散心位依二相立，不說定心，若在定心緣一切相皆現量攝，由此總緣智亦現量攝斷惑，無失，即由定照共相自體故，說定心為現量也。第二說：有義：定心唯緣自相，然由共相方便所引，緣諸共相所顯理者，就方便說名知共相，不如是者名知自相。由此道理，或說真如名空、無我諸法共相，或說真如二空所顯非是共相。由此義故，《對法》等說緣共相智能斷惑者，依方便說，實自相觀方能斷之。第三說：如實義者，彼因明論立自共相，與此少異，彼說一切法上實義皆名自相。以諸法上自相、共相，各附已體不共他故。若分別心立一種類能詮、所詮，通在諸法如縷貫華，名為共相。此要散心分別假立是比量境，一切定心離此分別，皆名現量。雖緣諸法苦、無常等，亦一一法各別有故，名為自相。真如雖是共相所顯，以是諸法自實性故。自有相故，亦非共相，不可以其與一切法不一不異，即名共相，自相亦與一切共相不一異故，是故彼論與此不同。由此義故，《對法》等說緣共相智能斷惑者，依分別心於一種類真如之上通在諸法說名共相，或真如體諸法皆有義名共相，緣此之智名共相智。論實真如法實性故，非是共相，據實而言，即別相智能斷惑也。共相假立，已如前辨。

The Commentary states: From this, the seventh [fascicle] of the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā and other texts ask: 'From what is severance attained?' Answer: 'Not from the past, because it has already ceased; not from the future, because it has not yet arisen; not from the present, because it does not co-exist with the path. Rather, it is severed from the crudity (dauṣṭhulya) of the afflictions. In order to sever such-and-such a grade of crudity, such-and-such a grade of antidote arises. If this grade of antidote arises, this grade of crudity is extinguished, just as in the world light arises and darkness is extinguished. Because this grade becomes free from bond, it causes future afflictions to abide in the state of non-arising. This is called severance.' Therefore, the path and afflictions cannot be said to co-exist. Question: When severance is spoken of here, is it severing the bond of objective support (ālambanabandhana) or severing the bond of association (saṃprayuktabandhana)? Answer: If it is the cognitive obstacle, one speaks only of severing crudity, because its essence is not a binding factor. If it is the affliction obstacle, severance is spoken of in terms of both. [Fascicle] fifty-nine says: 'When the path of the antidote arises, afflictions do not arise, and one attains the state of non-arising; therefore it is said to sever their association. When association has been severed, they no longer take objects as conditions; therefore severance is also spoken of with respect to the cognitive object.' Although severing crudity also applies to the affliction obstacle, severance in terms of both applies only to afflictions. Furthermore, the seeds of the cognitive obstacle obstruct the wisdom of the ten grounds and are defiled in nature; when a bodhisattva severs them, they sever the very substance of those seeds, just as those of the two vehicles sever the seeds of afflictions. However, when those of the two vehicles sever the obstacles to absorption and so forth, they merely sever crudity to make them compliant, but cannot sever their seeds, unlike a bodhisattva. Question: When severance is spoken of here, is it that wisdom taking all in general as its object can sever them, or is it that wisdom taking particulars as its object can sever them? What fault would there be in this? Wisdom taking all in general as its object is not wisdom of particular characteristics (svalakṣaṇa); how could an inferential wisdom of common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) sever afflictions? If wisdom of particular characteristics can sever them, that contradicts the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā, [fascicle] fifty-nine, and other texts. The seventh [fascicle] of the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā and other texts state: 'Question: What kind of attention (manaskāra) is capable of severing? Answer: General-object attention, which contemplates all phenomena as lacking the nature of a self, is capable of severing afflictions.' Buddhasiṃha says: 'General-object attention refers to attention operating by taking the common characteristics of all phenomena collectively as its object.' Answer: As stated in the sixth [fascicle] of the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra: How can a Buddha know common characteristics? Since common characteristics are posited on the basis of inference (anumāna), could a Buddha's knowledge of common characteristics be inferential? In that text there are three explanations: The first opinion: The two pramāṇas are posited in the state of a distracted mind based on the two characteristics, and do not refer to a concentrated mind; if one is in a concentrated mind, taking all characteristics as objects is entirely subsumed under direct perception (pratyakṣa). Therefore, wisdom taking all in general as its object is also subsumed under direct perception and severs afflictions, without any fault; that is, because concentration illuminates the intrinsic substance of common characteristics, the concentrated mind is said to be direct perception. The second explanation: There is an opinion that the concentrated mind takes only particular characteristics as its object; however, because it is led by the expedient means of common characteristics, when it takes the principle revealed by common characteristics as its object, it is said to know common characteristics with respect to the expedient means; when it is not like this, it is said to know particular characteristics. According to this reasoning, sometimes tathatā is called the common characteristic of all phenomena—emptiness and selflessness—and sometimes tathatā, being revealed by the two emptinesses, is not a common characteristic. Due to this meaning, when the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā and other texts say that wisdom taking common characteristics as its object can sever afflictions, this is said based on the expedient means; in reality, only the contemplation of particular characteristics can sever them. The third explanation: The true meaning is that the establishment of particular and common characteristics in that Hetuvidyā-śāstra differs slightly from this. That text states that all real entities upon phenomena are named particular characteristics, because the particular and common characteristics upon phenomena each adhere to their own substance and are not shared with others. If the conceptual mind establishes a single category of expresser and expressed that pervades various phenomena like a thread stringing flowers, this is called a common characteristic. This must be an object of inference conceptually imputed by a distracted mind; all concentrated minds are free from this discrimination, and are entirely named direct perception. Even though they take suffering, impermanence, and so forth of phenomena as their objects, each individual phenomenon possesses them distinctly, and thus they are called particular characteristics. Although tathatā is revealed by common characteristics, because it is the intrinsic true nature of phenomena, and because it has its own characteristic, it is also not a common characteristic; it cannot be called a common characteristic simply because it is neither one nor different from all phenomena, since particular characteristics are also neither one nor different from all common characteristics. Therefore, that treatise differs from this one. Due to this meaning, when the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā and other texts say that wisdom taking common characteristics as its object can sever afflictions, it is spoken of based on the conceptual mind taking a single category of tathatā as pervading various phenomena and calling it a common characteristic, or because the substance of tathatā is possessed by all phenomena, which is called a common characteristic, and the wisdom that takes this as its object is called wisdom of common characteristics. In truth, because tathatā is the true nature of phenomena, it is not a common characteristic; speaking according to reality, it is indeed wisdom of particular characteristics that can sever afflictions. That common characteristics are conceptually imputed has already been explained above.