成唯識論述記 10.230

10.230

述曰：《十地》云：「邪行於眾生身等障」，世親《攝論》云：於諸有情身等邪行障，義意大同。「所知障」者，簡煩惱障；「俱生」之言，簡分別起；「一分」之說，簡餘修斷諸所知障。下准此解。「誤犯三業」名愚者，愚品故，解如前。問：前二種生死中，言所知障不能發業，何故此中言俱生一分所發三業是業趣愚？《佛地論》第七亦言：若所發業所得果皆所知障體？答：若發業招生死，所知障即不能，非縛法故，前二生死由此說不發。若障智三業不招惡果，此亦能發。此文所明但是等流、增上業果。問：法執既通不善，何故非縛？答：不由不善性即是縛，如心王等性即非縛。法執但由煩惱俱故，令成不善，非性是縛。既爾，何故不感異熟？今實義者，雖不善心俱仍名無記，菩薩、二乘所望各別，即通有覆、無覆無記故，不能招異熟果等，故無前難。

The Commentary states: The Daśabhūmika says, 'the obstruction of wrongful conduct regarding the bodies and so forth of sentient beings.' Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya says, 'the obstruction of wrongful conduct regarding the bodies and so forth of sentient beings.' The intended meaning is largely the same. 'Cognitive obstruction' excludes affective obstructions; the word 'innate' excludes conceptually constructed ones; the expression 'a portion' excludes the remaining cognitive obstructions abandoned by cultivation. Below should be understood accordingly. Calling 'mistakenly committing the three karmas' ignorance is because it belongs to the class of ignorance, explained as above. Question: In the previous discussion of the two kinds of saṃsāra, it was said that cognitive obstructions cannot initiate karma; why does it say here that the three karmas initiated by the innate portion are the ignorance of the inclination to karma? Fascicle 7 of the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra also states that both the karma initiated and the fruit obtained are the essence of cognitive obstruction. Answer: If it is initiating karma that brings about saṃsāra, cognitive obstructions cannot do so, because they are not phenomena that bind; hence, the two kinds of saṃsāra previously discussed are said not to be initiated [by them]. But if it is the three karmas that obstruct knowledge and do not bring about bad fruits, this [obstruction] can indeed initiate them. What this text clarifies is only the karmic fruit of identical flow and predominance. Question: Since grasping at dharmas includes what is unwholesome, why is it not a binding? Answer: It is not that by virtue of an unwholesome nature it is a binding; for example, the nature of the mind-king and so forth is not a binding. Grasping at dharmas is made unwholesome merely by being conjoined with afflictions; its nature is not a binding. If so, why does it not induce maturation? Now, the true meaning is: although conjoined with an unwholesome mind, it is still called indeterminate; the perspectives of bodhisattvas and the two vehicles are different, and thus it includes both obscured and unobscured indeterminate; hence it cannot induce the fruit of maturation and so on. Therefore, the preceding objection does not hold.