成唯識論述記 10.348

10.348

述曰：世親云：「於此中無計我所，無攝我所，如北洲人無有繫屬」。無性云：「謂契經等法愛斷故，不計我所，觀此非自他攝」。新《中邊》云：由通達此，乃至法愛亦皆斷滅。又解，今此中說：彼皆不盡理，應說此如無繫屬，非我執、我慢、我愛、無明、邊見、我所見等所依取故，但言「我所」即性狹故。由緣法愛無故，我見等不依如取之，謂此真如但為境故，名為我所，餘論說之。此中但說我境聚故，如不離彼法，我執起時亦取如故。今不於彼起我等執，但言「我見」，即不攝所；但言「我所」即不攝見，今言「我執」通見及所，上准此釋。

The Commentary states: Vasubandhu says: "Herein, one does not falsely calculate 'mine' and does not grasp 'mine', just as the people of Uttarakuru have no attachments." Asvabhāva says: "Because attachment to the Dharma, such as sūtras, is severed, one does not falsely calculate 'mine', viewing this as not belonging to oneself or another." The new Madhyāntavibhāga says: By penetrating this, even attachment to the Dharma is completely cut off. Another explanation says: what is spoken of here [in our text] is that those [explanations] do not exhaust the principle. One should say that this tathatā is free of attachments because it is not that which is relied upon and grasped by ātmagrāha, ātmamāna, ātmasneha, avidyā, antagrāhadṛṣṭi, ātmadṛṣṭi, and so forth; merely saying "mine" would make its nature too narrow. Because attachment to phenomena based on conditions is absent, ātmadṛṣṭi and so forth do not grasp tathatā as their basis; other treatises say that because this tathatā merely serves as an object, it is called "mine." Here it is only spoken of as the aggregation of objects of the self, because tathatā is not separate from those phenomena, and when ātmagrāha arises, it also grasps tathatā. Now, one does not produce grasps of the self and so forth toward it. If one merely says "view of self," it does not subsume "mine"; if one merely says "mine," it does not subsume "view of self." Now, saying "ātmagrāha" encompasses both the view [of self] and [grasping at] mine; the above should be explained according to this.