成唯識論述記 10.673

10.673

述曰：一解云：等取心所所變現，所變名為行相。「依識變現」等者，唯難陀二分義，小分有異親、疎所緣，二皆不實故。以疎所緣等取親相，不為行相。此所疎知，如識變故。又立三分，并下有二，復次解。依識變現等者，相分等言，等取見分，識自體之所變故。此相、見分雖體是依他，識自體之用故，非如識性依他中實，識是根本自體故，彼是末是用故，如日及輪，如燈及光，實、虛異故。若不爾，應不言唯識，應言唯境、唯見分等。以許相、見與識自體，俱實有故。此義應思。設緣色等，見、相亦俱不實，不及於識，如緣過、未、虛空等識相分，雖有非稍實法，見分非無，仍緣虛境。虛境行相是不實心，故見不及識自體分，識自體分唯緣於識，是根本故，證自體故，體性是實有，其變似色等亦並不實。此師意也。若爾，無分別智境相如何？彼內證故，此所不論。如緣自體，餘是外境，故不同如。設緣真如自體實有，非識所變故。真如體實，今論所變故相、見假。又縱真如是實，以於境中少實有故，但言唯識，不言唯境，今以內證，是故不可例同於外。《佛地》第三有此師義，許有三分依他性義。

The Commentary states: One interpretation says: 'and so forth' includes what is transformed and manifested by the caitasikas; what is transformed is termed the ākāra. Regarding 'are transformed and manifested relying on consciousness' and so forth: this is solely Nanda's doctrine of two divisions, which slightly differs in that both direct and indirect cognitive objects (ālambana) are unreal. Because indirect cognitive objects include the direct nimitta by 'and so forth,' they are not taken as the ākāra. This indirect cognition is as consciousness transforms. Furthermore, three divisions are established, and together with below there are two further explanations. Regarding 'transformed and manifested relying on consciousness' and so forth: in the phrase 'the nimittabhāga and so forth,' 'and so forth' includes the darśanabhāga, because they are transformed by the substance of consciousness itself. Although the substance of this nimitta- and darśana-bhāga is paratantra, because they are functions of the substance of consciousness itself, they are not real within paratantra like the nature of consciousness; because consciousness is the fundamental substance itself, while they are branches and functions, just as the sun and its disk, or a lamp and its radiance, have differences of real and unreal. If it were not so, one should not say 'vijñapti-mātra' (consciousness-only); one should say 'object-only' or 'darśanabhāga-only' and so forth, because it would be conceded that the nimitta and darśana are both substantially real together with the substance of consciousness itself. This point should be considered. Even if one takes form and so forth as conditions, both darśana and nimitta are unreal and do not equal consciousness; just as in consciousness taking the past, future, space, and so forth as conditions, the nimittabhāga, though existent, is not a slightly real dharma; the darśanabhāga is not nonexistent, yet it still takes an unreal object as condition. An ākāra of an unreal object is an unreal mind, so the darśana does not equal the svasaṃvittibhāga of consciousness; the svasaṃvittibhāga of consciousness cognizes consciousness alone, and because it is fundamental and realizes its own substance, its substance and nature are substantially real, while what transforms to resemble form and so forth is entirely unreal. This is this master's intention. If so, what about the object and marks of non-discriminative wisdom? Because that is internal realization, it is not discussed here. Just as it cognizes its own substance, the rest are external objects; therefore it is not like suchness. Even if it takes tathatā as condition, its own substance is substantially real, because it is not transformed by consciousness. The substance of tathatā is real; now what is discussed is what is transformed, so the nimitta and darśana are designated. Furthermore, even if tathatā is real, because it is only slightly substantially real among objects, it is merely said to be 'consciousness-only' and not 'object-only'; now because it is internal realization, it cannot be made an example like the external. The third fascicle of the Buddhabhūmi[-vyākhyāna] contains this master's doctrine, conceding that the three divisions have the meaning of paratantrasvabhāva.