成唯識論述記 2.131

2.131

述曰：下第二、別破諸部。於中有二：初破薩婆多實有形，故言非實有；可分析故；如瓶等物，前已破表色處無故。今更破無表，故非實有，以彼長等以相形故成於形色，豈長等是實？相待之時便失相故。外人救曰：此實有性，有別長等極微性故，積集長性微即成長等，短等亦爾，故非表是假。若爾，應失微本圓相，或應極微有別長形者，微本圓相，性雖是長，而微不長，後此便變為其長等，豈非捨本微圓之相，而成長等？若謂不然，應量破云：汝長極微應無圓相；說是長故；如麁長等色。或積長等微應不成長等；微圓相故；如顯色微。長等極微不可得故，故表是假，寧為實有？

The Commentary states: Below is the second: specifically refuting the various schools. In it there are two: first, refuting the Sarvāstivādins who claim that shape is real. Hence it says it is not truly existent; because it can be analyzed; like a vase and other objects; for earlier it was already refuted that the locus of form is non-existent. Now [the treatise] further refutes that there is unmanifest [form], hence it is not truly existent. Since those [shapes like] long and so forth are constituted by mutual contrast, how could long and so forth be real? When they stand in mutual dependence, they lose their distinct characteristics. The opponent defends: This has a real nature, because there are distinct atom-natures of length and so forth; the aggregation of atoms possessing the nature of length constitutes length and so forth, and the same holds for shortness and so forth; hence manifest form is not nominal. If so, the original spherical mark of the atom would be lost, or atoms would have distinct shapes of length: although the nature is length, the atom itself is not long, and later it transforms into that length and so forth; does this not abandon the original spherical mark of the atom to become long and so forth? If one says it is not so, one should formulate a syllogism to refute it: Your atom of length should lack a spherical mark; because it is said to be long; like coarse long form and so forth. Or: the aggregation of atoms of length should not constitute length and so forth; because the atoms have a spherical mark; like atoms of visible color. Because atoms of length and so forth are impossible to find, manifest form is merely nominal; how could it be truly existent?