成唯識論述記 2.138

2.138

述曰：汝所執待因之滅，應非是滅；以待因故；如生、住等。生違於滅，滅待因而方滅；滅違於生，生應無因而自生。返覆成之，生違於滅，生待因而方生；滅違於生，不待因而自滅。此破正量，以彼部計展轉為救，故論連環展轉破之。不爾，從下向上成立亦得，先成滅不待因，既成已成有為法剎那滅，既成已成無動。〈菩薩地〉中四十六云：滅若有因，應更生故，此如生難。謂滅應更生；以待因故；如生。彼住等雖待因，然非是滅，又不極成，故非同喻，無不定失。

The Commentary states: The destruction depending on a cause that you cling to should not be destruction; because it depends on a cause; like arising, abiding, and so forth. Arising is opposed to destruction; if destruction depended on a cause in order to destroy, then since destruction is opposed to arising, arising should arise spontaneously without a cause. To establish it conversely: arising is opposed to destruction, and arising depends on a cause in order to arise; destruction is opposed to arising, and should cease spontaneously without depending on a cause. This refutes the Saṃmatīya; because that school posits reciprocal defenses, the treatise refutes them in an interlocking, step-by-step manner. Otherwise, establishing it from the bottom up would also work: first establish that destruction does not depend on a cause; once that is established, establish that conditioned dharmas are momentary; once that is established, establish that there is no movement. The forty-sixth fascicle of the Bodhisattvabhūmi states: 'If destruction had a cause, it would arise again,' which is an objection like that of arising. Namely: destruction should arise again; because it depends on a cause; like arising. Although their abiding and so forth depend on causes, they are not destruction and are not mutually established, so they cannot serve as homogeneous examples, and there is no fault of inconclusiveness.