成唯識論述記 2.286

2.286

述曰：此下第二、能、所無差難。若以於法起同言、智，便別有體者，同分亦起同言、智，應別有同分。彼說同分更無同分，此相似法云何乃然？量中翻覆，皆應准知。然彼救言：如所造是色為四大種所造，大種雖是色，更非他所造；同分亦然，體為能同，不假他同。此義失宗，若以造故名為色，四大無能造，故可名非色，但以變礙名為色，何得如同分？相似法上有同分故，又不然，大種有勝功能，稱大而是種，更無大故，不為他所造，同分更無有勝能。然體既非一，復起同言、智，與法既不殊，何為無同分？又體是能同故，更無別同分，亦應體是能生故，更無別物生。生體是能生，更為生所生；同分是同他，更應為他同。汝以大大返徵，我以生生却逐，設欲翻其勝論，尚自難知，何況許有同分實？而自墜耳。

The Commentary states: Below this is the second [refutation], the challenge that there would be no distinction between the agent of making similar and that which is made similar. If, because a common designation and cognition arise with respect to dharmas, there is a separate substantial entity [called commonality], then because a common designation and cognition also arise with respect to commonality, there should be another, separate commonality. You say that commonality has no further commonality; why then is this not also so for these similar dharmas? The reversals within the inference should all be known accordingly. However, they rescue [their view] by saying: Just as derived matter is matter and is derived from the four great elements, and the great elements, though matter, are not further derived from others, commonality is likewise: its substantial nature is that which makes things similar, and does not depend on another to be made similar. This explanation abandons their own tenet. If something is called matter because of being derived, then since the four great elements lack that which derives [them], they could be called non-matter; but since matter is designated merely on the grounds of transformability and obstruction, how can it be like commonality? For commonality is found upon similar dharmas. Furthermore, this is incorrect: the great elements have superior efficacy, being called 'great' and being 'elements', and because there are no further great [elements], they are not derived from others; but commonality has no further superior efficacy. However, since its substance is not one, and furthermore a common designation and cognition arise with respect to it, it is not distinct from [other] dharmas; why then would it lack commonality? Moreover, if because its substance is that which makes similar there is no further separate commonality, then it should also follow that because its substance is that which produces there is no separate entity that produces [it]. The substance of origination is that which produces, yet it is further produced by origination; commonality makes others similar, so it should further be made similar by another. You cross-examine me by [analogy with] the great elements, but I pursue you back with origination and production. Even if you wished to overturn the Vaiśeṣikas, it would still be difficult to understand [on your terms]; how much less [can it stand] when you assert a real commonality, thus merely causing your own downfall.