成唯識論述記 2.325

2.325

述曰：此中義意，但依本識自體分種。今論主言：依者，顯體是假，依實上立，「依」謂所依。親者，即簡異熟因，雖生此識是增上緣，非親生故。此中據名言種為因緣，親生此識種子者是。言「生」者，簡名言之種身中，極多非業所牽，不能親為因緣生於今識。今取生者，簡去不生。言「此」者，簡親生餘識種子。言「識」者，簡相應法種，唯取識種故。言「種」者，簡現行，不取第八現行為命根故，彼所簡者皆非命根。今取親生之名言種上，由先世業所引持身之差別功能，令色心等住時決定，依此功能說名命根，非取生現行識義，以此種子為業力故，有持一期之身功能差別，令得決定。若此種子無此功能，身便爛壞。阿賴耶識現行，由此種故，能緣及住持於眼等法，亦名能持，此種正能持於現行之識。若不爾者，現行之識應不得有，及無能持餘根等法，由此功能故識持於身。現行由種力故生，及緣持法，不名命根，非根本故。由種生故，此種不由現行有故，種為諸法之根本故，如〈決擇〉二十二根中命根無所屬。若取現識為根，即定屬意，何故云無屬？先業所引種上別功能為命根故，是此中意。然《顯揚》第一等言，六處住時決定假立命者，即第六意處是。此本識種子故，如無始法爾。六處相續言，唯取第六處。又是現行，識所持故，從所持說能持種業名命根。命根所持，體非命根。令六處住時決定故，故種為命根，餘現行色心等非命根，不恒續故，非業所引故。然業正牽時，唯牽此種子，種子方能生現行，非謂現行名命根，故唯種是根。又解云：此識種子者，謂五根是本識之相分，相分不離識故，總名此識種子。然功能雖是一體，是色及心差別故。唯言此識，此中見、相種子同體之義。取六處種子皆命根體，雖知二解，或本識種，或六處種子，六處種子中五處或時中斷，而本識獨在，不名為死。取五根種者，即應有死，以於中間無功能故。或命根三界有差別故，或命根應非一，以種子非一故。雖復釋言見、相同種，既五根種即本識種，與前解何別？俱唯一種子體故。若相、見別種，此如何通？有多過故，前解為勝，亦順正理。如下第八增上緣中，亦唯取本識種子故，此通無漏，佛亦有故。

The Commentary states: The intended meaning here is that [the life-faculty] is posited solely based on the bījas of the fundamental consciousness's own substantive part (svabhāgabhāga). Now the author of the treatise says: 'based on' shows that its substance is nominal, established upon the real; 'based on' refers to the basis. 'Directly produced' excludes the retributive cause (vipākahetu), which, although it produces this consciousness, is a predominant condition (adhipatipratyaya) and not a direct producer. Here, taking the nominal-expression bījas (nāmaprajñaptibīja) as the cause-condition (hetupratyaya), it is those bījas that directly produce this consciousness. The word 'produced' excludes the extremely numerous nominal-expression bījas in the body that are not impelled by karma and cannot directly serve as cause-conditions to produce the present consciousness; here, taking those that are produced excludes those that are not produced. The word 'this' excludes bījas that directly produce other consciousnesses. The word 'consciousness' excludes the bījas of associated mental factors, taking only the bījas of consciousness. The word 'bījas' excludes active manifestations (samudācāra), because the active manifestation of the eighth [consciousness] is not taken as the life-faculty; all those excluded are not the life-faculty. Here, on the directly producing nominal-expression bījas, by the differentiated function of sustaining the body impelled by previous karma, causing form, mind, and so forth to abide for a determinate duration—based on this function, it is nominally called the life-faculty; it does not take the meaning of producing the active consciousness. Because this bīja possesses the force of karma, it has the differentiated function of sustaining the body for a single lifespan, causing it to attain determinacy. If this bīja lacked this function, the body would decay and rot. The active ālayavijñāna, by means of this bīja, is able to apprehend and sustain phenomena such as the eye, and is also called 'able to sustain'; this bīja directly sustains the active consciousness. If this were not so, the active consciousness could not exist, nor would there be anything able to sustain the other sense faculties and phenomena; by virtue of this function, consciousness sustains the body. The active manifestation, which arises by the force of the bīja and apprehends and sustains phenomena, is not called the life-faculty, because it is not fundamental. Because it is produced by the bīja, and this bīja does not exist by virtue of the active manifestation, the bīja is the root of all phenomena; as stated in the 'Viniścaya' [of the Yogācārabhūmi], among the twenty-two faculties, the life-faculty has no specific attribution. If the active consciousness were taken as the faculty, it would definitely pertain to the mind (manas); why then is it said to have no attribution? Because the distinct function on the bījas impelled by previous karma is the life-faculty—this is the intention here. However, when Prakaraṇāryavācā, fascicle 1, and so forth say that the determinate abiding of the six bases (ṣaḍāyatana) is nominally designated as life, that refers to the sixth, the mental base (manāyatana). Because this is the bīja of the fundamental consciousness, it is beginningless and intrinsically so. When speaking of the continuity of the six bases, only the sixth base is taken. Moreover, as an active manifestation, it is sustained by consciousness; thus, from the perspective of what is sustained, the karmic bīja that is able to sustain is called the life-faculty. That which is sustained by the life-faculty is not in substance the life-faculty. Because it causes the six bases to abide for a determinate duration, bījas are the life-faculty; the other active forms, minds, and so forth are not the life-faculty, because they are not constantly continuous and are not impelled by karma. However, when karma directly impels, it impels solely this bīja, and only then can the bīja produce the active manifestation; it does not mean that the active manifestation is called the life-faculty, and therefore only the bīja is the faculty. Another interpretation says: 'the bījas of this consciousness' means that the five faculties are the objective aspect (nimittabhāga) of the fundamental consciousness, and because the objective aspect is not separate from consciousness, they are collectively called the bījas of this consciousness. However, although their function is of one substance, there is a distinction between form and mind. Therefore it only speaks of 'this consciousness,' which is the meaning here that the bījas of the subjective and objective aspects share the same substance. Taking the bījas of the six bases as the substance of the life-faculty—although two interpretations are recognized, either the bījas of the fundamental consciousness or the bījas of the six bases—among the bījas of the six bases, five bases may at times be interrupted, while the fundamental consciousness remains alone, which is not called death. If one took the bījas of the five faculties, then death would occur, because they lack function in the interim; or else the life-faculty would have distinctions across the three realms; or the life-faculty would not be one, because the bījas are not one. Although it is further explained that the subjective and objective share the same bīja, since the bījas of the five faculties are just the bījas of the fundamental consciousness, how does this differ from the previous interpretation? For both have only a single bīja substance. If the objective and subjective had distinct bījas, how could this be reconciled? Because there are many faults, the previous interpretation is superior and also accords with correct reasoning. As below, under the predominant condition of the eighth [consciousness], only the bījas of the fundamental consciousness are taken; this applies to the undefiled as well, for Buddhas also possess it.