成唯識論述記 2.368

2.368

述曰：第三、二相應齊難。此論主徵：經言無為寂靜為相，又經說言無為之相，故離能相無別所相。量云：汝無為相應離體有；說之相言故；如有為相。返為有為，比量可知。然今論主理亦應然。經說有為相，別立其假相；經說無為相，應別立假相。假相有立、不立；實相亦然，亦有有者，有無者故。有為有變異差別可立假，無為體不異，何須立假相無為，無生、無老、無滅，亦應立此三種能相。體無起盡，又非多法顯分位殊，故無為法不假立相，此義應思。外人復云：無為不墮世，不與能相合；有為既墮世，故與能相合。此亦不然，有為墮世，墮世相合；無為非世，非世相合。大乘應爾，無為非世，非世無假相；有為墮世，墮世無假相。此難不然，為顯差別墮世立相，無為自法無差別，何得立假相？

The Commentary states: Third is the objection that the two sets of marks should be parallel. The author of the treatise challenges: The sūtra states that unconditioned phenomena have tranquility as their mark, and the sūtra also speaks of the 'marks of the unconditioned'; therefore, apart from what marks, there is no separate entity that is marked. The syllogism is: Your mark of the unconditioned should exist apart from its substance; because it is spoken of with the phrase 'mark of...'; just like the marks of the conditioned. The reverse argument regarding the conditioned is understood by inversion. But now for the author of the treatise, the principle should also be like this: When the sūtra speaks of marks of the conditioned, it separately establishes them as provisional marks; when the sūtra speaks of marks of the unconditioned, it should also separately establish provisional marks. Provisional marks can be established or not established; real marks are also like this, because there are cases where they exist and cases where they do not. Because conditioned phenomena possess changes and distinctions, one may establish provisional [marks] for them; but since the substance of the unconditioned does not differ, why would there be a need to establish provisional marks for it? If the unconditioned lacks birth, lacks aging, and lacks destruction, then one should also establish these three kinds of marking entities. Since its substance has no arising or passing away, and furthermore it is not a multitude of phenomena demonstrating distinctions of states, no provisional marks are established for unconditioned phenomena; this meaning should be contemplated. The outsider says again: 'The unconditioned does not fall into the temporal periods, so it does not combine with marking entities; the conditioned does fall into the temporal periods, and therefore it combines with marking entities.' This is also not correct: if the conditioned falls into the temporal periods, it would combine with what falls into the temporal periods; if the unconditioned is not of the temporal periods, it would combine with what is not of the temporal periods. For the Mahāyāna, it should be like this: the unconditioned is not of the temporal periods, so non-temporal periods have no provisional marks; the conditioned falls into the temporal periods, so what falls into the temporal periods has no provisional marks. This objection is invalid: to show distinctions in what falls into the temporal periods, marks are established; but since the unconditioned phenomenon itself has no distinctions, how could provisional marks be established for it?