成唯識論述記 2.381

2.381

述曰：此既本有，何不頓生？所待因緣若先無者，便違自執。論主亦然，種子體本有，何不用恒生？種子體本無，理應無種子。若以假故要待緣，合方生，我亦實故，要待實緣方起。汝實緣現有，何不恒合？汝假緣恒有，何不頓生？解云：虛疎之法，緣雖現有種，更無外緣即不能起，以劣弱故。汝之實法何得例然？此義應思。正理論師復救之曰：法待因緣，故不頓起。因有親疎，緣法亦爾。親因雖有，無疎緣用亦不得生；如雖有種，水不合時，芽不生故。次子段第三、生等無能難，論主破。

The Commentary states: Since this is originally existent, why is it not born all at once? If the causes and conditions depended upon did not exist previously, one contradicts one's own tenets. It is also like this for the author of the treatise: If the substance of the seed is originally existent, why does its function not constantly arise? If the substance of the seed is originally non-existent, logically there should be no seeds. If it is said that because it is provisional, it must depend on the conjunction of conditions before it is born, then my [dharma] is also real, so it must depend on real conditions before it arises. If your real conditions are presently existent, why are they not constantly conjoined? If your provisional conditions are constantly existent, why are they not born all at once? The explanation says: For unsubstantial phenomena, although conditions are presently existent for the seed, if there are no further external conditions, it cannot arise, because of its inferiority and weakness. How could your real phenomena be analogous to this? This meaning should be contemplated. The Nyāyānusāra master rescues it again, saying: 'Dharmas depend on causes and conditions, and therefore do not arise all at once. Causes can be direct or indirect; the condition-dharmas are also like this. Although the direct cause exists, without the function of the indirect conditions, it still cannot be born; just as although there is a seed, when it does not combine with water, the sprout does not grow.' Next is the third sub-clause, the objection that birth and the others lack capability, which the author of the treatise refutes.