成唯識論述記 2.393

2.393

述曰：子段第三、滅生相翻難。此論主難，生滅體相違，生法體是有，滅、生相返故，滅法體成無。滅體若非無，生應非是有。然正理師，未來之世生有功能，及過去有與果功能，而非作用；作用唯現在，即是取果用。此亦不然，何不去來法皆令有功能？生非作用，與果亦非是作用故，即未來一切法應恒時生，過去一切法應恒與果。若言作用說現在，過、未說功能，即現在有功能，應名為過、未。唯住相取果，可名作用；異、滅不能取果，即是功能，便非現在。若謂作用不要取果，即顯生相亦非功能。此義應審，諸論無有。《婆沙》第三說，未來三法有作用者，復如何通？

The Commentary states: The third sub-clause is the objection of the mutual inversion of destruction and birth. This is the objection by the author of the treatise: The substances of birth and destruction are mutually opposed; the phenomenon of birth is existent in substance, and because destruction and birth are mutually inverted, the phenomenon of destruction becomes non-existent in substance. If the substance of destruction is not non-existent, birth should not be existent. However, the Nyāyānusāra master holds that in the future time, birth has capability, and the past has the capability to give a result, but these are not activity (kāritra); activity is only in the present, namely the activity of grasping a result. This is also incorrect: why not make all past and future phenomena have capability? Since birth is not activity, and giving a result is also not activity, all future phenomena should constantly be born, and all past phenomena should constantly give results. If it is said that activity is spoken of in the present, while capability is spoken of in the past and future, then since the present has capability, it should be called past or future. Only the mark of abiding grasps a result and can be called activity; decay and destruction cannot grasp a result, which means they are capabilities and thus would not be present. If it is maintained that activity does not require grasping a result, this shows that the mark of birth is also not a capability. This meaning should be examined; it is not found in the various treatises. The third fascicle of the Vibhāṣā states that three future phenomena have activity; how can that again be reconciled?