成唯識論述記 2.443

2.443

述曰：子段第四，例生能詮難，更成語詮。彼復救言：風鈴等聲是外法，不能生名等；語聲是內法，何妨即能別生名者。且就彼計，申自義云：語聲是內聲，聲體即能詮；風鈴聲是外，即不能詮表。汝雖內聲能生名，非一切內聲皆能生名，我雖內聲能詮表，非一切內聲皆能詮。正義應言：汝許語聲方能生名，非風鈴等；我許屈曲之聲有詮表，如絃管等。即風鈴等既無屈曲，不能詮表，無能詮用故；內聲生名有能詮定量，內聲詮表何妨亦是能詮定量。外法聲不然，生名之聲有能詮，彼無能詮故。

The Commentary states: The fourth sub-section, the objection by analogy of production to signification, further establishing that speech alone signifies. The opponent rescues again, saying: 'The sounds of wind, bells, and so forth are external phenomena and cannot produce words and so forth; speech sound is an internal phenomenon, so what prevents it from separately producing words?' Provisionally adopting their view, we state our own thesis: Speech sound is an internal sound, and the substance of the sound itself is able to signify; the sound of wind and bells is external, and thus cannot signify. Even though for you internal sound can produce words, not all internal sounds can produce words; and although for me internal sound can signify, not all internal sounds can signify. The correct doctrine should state: You accept that only speech sound can produce words, not wind, bells, and so forth; I accept that modulated sound has signification, like strings and pipes. Since wind, bells, and so forth have no modulations, they cannot signify, lacking a signifying function; internal sound producing words has a definitive signifying capacity, so why should internal sound's signification not also be a definitive signifying capacity? External sound is not like this: the sound that produces words has signification, while the other lacks signification.