成唯識論述記 2.447

2.447

述曰：論主詰云：汝亦「寧知異語」聲體「別有」名「能詮」。汝言：能生名等名等，能詮故異語者，汝如何生？不可一法分分漸生。又諸念聲非聚集起，如何名生？亦應初念聲即能生名等。彼若救言：如無表發，待前表等，最後生故。既爾，即應末聲生名，汝應但聞末後之聲，便能解義；理既不爾，故知但由無始串習，前前諸聲分位力故，後生解時，謂聞名等，其實耳等但能取得聲之自性，剎那便滅，意識於中詮解究竟名為名等，非別實有，是故汝等，寧知異語別有能詮？

The Commentary states: The author of the treatise interrogates them, saying: How do you also know that apart from the substance of speech sound there is a distinct signifier, namely words? You say: sound can produce words and so forth, and words and so forth can signify, therefore they are distinct from speech. But how do you say they are produced? It is impossible for a single phenomenon to be produced gradually, part by part. Furthermore, sounds of different moments do not arise as an aggregation; how then are words produced? The sound of the very first moment should also be able to produce words and so forth. If they rescue by saying: 'Just like the manifestation of unmanifest action (avijñapti), which depends on previous manifest actions and arises only at the very end,' if so, then only the final sound would produce words, and you should understand the meaning merely by hearing the final sound. Since logically this is not so, we know that it is only through beginningless conditioning and the force of the sequential states of the preceding sounds that when understanding later arises, one imagines that one hears words and so forth. In reality, the ear and so forth can only apprehend the intrinsic nature of sound, which perishes in a moment; the mental consciousness, completely interpreting within it, designates this as words and so forth, which are not distinct, real entities. Therefore, how do you know that apart from speech there is a distinct signifier?