成唯識論述記 2.456

2.456

問曰：如色蘊是自相，漏、無漏是共相，色蘊之中色處等是自相，色蘊是共相；色處中青等是自相，色處是共相；又青等是共相，隨一樹等是自相；樹等是共相，枝等是自相；枝等是共相，極微為自相。今言不得自相，為是不得色蘊——色總自相，為不得青等——色別自相。答曰：俱不得色及青等，皆詮不及故。問曰：若爾，即漏、無漏等豈詮得及，如佛言有漏，佛言非有漏；凡夫言無漏，凡夫言非無漏；如詮火時亦不燒口，豈得漏、無漏耶？而言「名」得共相之自性，此義但遮得自相，非謂「名」即得共相。然法體不可說自相、共相，以假言詮也，謂有定量，且名共相。非謂自、共相者，名言所及，何故不立頌為不相應？以離名、句、文無別用故，詮法體義名、句以周，為二所依，文用已足，故頌不立，進不及名等，退不如文故。此雖有多字未了有名，如《悉曇》章等；有多字名未了有句，如《雜心》云：眼、耳及與鼻等，雖有名字無句，顯義未圓故。若《般若燈》集法滿足，即說為句。今是名攝故，不別說頌。問曰：上來雖言名等即聲，若名等是不相應行者，色上屈曲非不相應，聲何故爾？

Question: For instance, the form aggregate is an individual characteristic, while with-outflows and without-outflows are common characteristics; within the form aggregate, the form base (rūpāyatana) and so on are individual characteristics, while the form aggregate is a common characteristic; within the form base, blue and so on are individual characteristics, while the form base is a common characteristic; again, blue and so on are common characteristics, while any single particular tree or the like is an individual characteristic; a tree and so on are common characteristics, while branches and so on are individual characteristics; branches and so on are common characteristics, while paramāṇus are individual characteristics. Now when you say that it does not apprehend individual characteristics, does it fail to apprehend the form aggregate—the general individual characteristic of form—or does it fail to apprehend blue and so forth—the particular individual characteristics of form? Answer: It fails to apprehend both form and blue and so on, because speech cannot reach any of them. Question: If so, then how could speech reach with-outflows, without-outflows, and the like? Just as when the Buddha says 'with-outflows', the Buddha says 'not with-outflows'; when an ordinary person says 'without-outflows', an ordinary person says 'not without-outflows'; and just as expressing 'fire' does not burn the mouth, how could it apprehend with-outflows or without-outflows? And yet it is said that 'names' apprehend the intrinsic nature of the common characteristic; this meaning merely excludes apprehending the individual characteristic, not that 'names' directly apprehend the common characteristic. Rather, the entity of a dharma cannot be spoken of as individual characteristic or common characteristic; it is expressed by conventional designations, and because there is a determinate measure, it is tentatively called a common characteristic. It does not mean that individual and common characteristics are literally reached by names and speech. Why is verse (gāthā) not established as a separate non-associated conditioning factor? Because apart from names, sentences, and syllables, it has no separate function. Expressing the entities and meanings of dharmas is already exhausted by names and sentences, and serving as the support for both is sufficiently fulfilled by the function of syllables. Therefore verses are not established separately: advancing, they cannot match names and sentences; retreating, they are not like syllables. Here, although there are many syllables, they may not yet constitute a name, as in the Siddhaṃ syllabary chapters; there may be names with many syllables that do not yet constitute a sentence, as in the Samyuktābhidharmahṛdaya: 'eyes, ears, and nose'—although they have names, they do not have a sentence, because the manifestation of meaning is not yet complete. If, as in the Prajñāpradīpa, the compilation of dharmas is complete, then it is called a sentence. Here verses are subsumed under names [and sentences], so verses are not spoken of separately. Question: Although you have previously said that names and so forth are identical with sound, if names and so forth are non-associated conditioning factors, while the physical modulations (kuṭilatā) upon matter are not non-associated, why is sound treated this way?