成唯識論述記 2.634

2.634

述曰：申喻有二，初指後例，此即初也，舉世三事。如有真火，名為真事；有似火人，即是似事；有猛赤法，說為共法。火、人之上俱有猛赤，故名共法。此中難意，既有所變色等能似之法，有善、惡作用等共法，即於三中有似事、共法，明知，心外有別真法名為真事。如無真火，不可說人似於火故，然似事中有法，無我，我但有名，無相分故。法則不爾，依他性故。「法」謂軌持，依他之中有法；「我」謂主宰，依他之中無我，法無主宰故。若和合時名假主宰，此即是我，無別種生，依他假我，如瓶、盆等，不同於法，有別種生，說雖極微亦名法故，我則不爾。又如婆羅門，其性猛，其色赤，猶如火，如世人說此婆羅門赤急似火，火是真事，人為似事，猛赤是共法，可說婆羅門似火。三法闕一，假義不成，若無真事，即似於誰？若無似事，說誰為似？無猛赤法，如何似也？

The Commentary states: Setting forth the example has two parts: first, pointing to the specific, and then generalizing. This is the first, adducing three worldly matters. For instance, the presence of real fire is called the real entity; the presence of a person resembling fire is the resembling entity; the property of fierceness and redness is called the common property. Both fire and the person possess fierceness and redness, so it is called a common property. The intent of the objection here is: since there are resembling phenomena such as the transformed matter, and common properties such as wholesome and unwholesome actions, then among the three there exist the resembling entity and the common property; hence it is clear that outside the mind there is a separate real phenomenon called the real entity. If there were no real fire, one could not say that a person resembles fire. However, among resembling entities there are phenomena, but no self; the self has only a name, without any nimittabhāga. Phenomena are not like this, because they belong to the dependent nature. 'Phenomenon' means holding one's own nature (dhāraṇa); among dependent entities there are phenomena. 'Self' means lord and controller; among dependent entities there is no self, for phenomena lack a controller. When aggregated, they are called a metaphorical controller, which is the self; it has no separate seed-origin, being an aggregated metaphorical self like a vase, bowl, and so forth, unlike phenomena which have separate seed-origins, for even a subtle atom is called a phenomenon, whereas a self is not so. Moreover, as with a Brahmin whose disposition is fierce and whose complexion is red, like fire, as worldly people say: 'This Brahmin is impetuous and red like fire.' Fire is the real entity, the person is the resembling entity, and fierceness and redness are the common property; thus one can say the Brahmin resembles fire. If any one of the three phenomena is lacking, the meaning of metaphor is not established. If there is no real entity, whom does it resemble? If there is no resembling entity, who is said to be resembling? If there is no property of fierceness and redness, how could it resemble?