成唯識論述記 2.638

2.638

述曰：此結成難。若有我、法名為真事，識所變者名為似事，所變上有不捨色等法之自相，名為「共法」，可說所變名為「似法」，說之為假，今無心外我、法真事。真事既無故，所說假依何得有？無所說義，假法故。其體似法亦不成，似無依故，即義依體假。又所變之似既無，能說之假既無，所變之似不有，即有體施設假。此似既無，如何說心似外境轉？外境無故。心何所似？誰似於誰？誰為能似？是彼難也。世間我、法標宗說無，故今但難聖教我、法。

The Commentary states: This establishes the objection. If there were self and phenomena as real entities, that which is transformed by consciousness as the resembling entity, and on what is transformed there were the specific characteristics of not abandoning form and so forth as the 'common property', one could say that what is transformed is a 'resembling phenomenon' and speak of it as a metaphor. Now there are no real entities of self and phenomena external to the mind. Since real entities do not exist, based on what can the spoken metaphor exist? Because without a designated referent, it is a metaphorical phenomenon. The substance of the resembling phenomenon is also not established, because the resemblance lacks a basis; this is metaphor of meaning relying on substance. Furthermore, since the resemblance of what is transformed does not exist, and the metaphor of designation does not exist, the resemblance of what is transformed cannot be; this is metaphorical designation of an existent substance. Since this resemblance does not exist, how can it be said that the mind evolves as a semblance of external objects? Because external objects do not exist, what does the mind resemble? Who resembles whom? What acts as that which resembles? Such is their objection. Worldly self and phenomena are posited as non-existent in our thesis, so now they only object to the self and phenomena of the sacred teachings.