成唯識論述記 2.644

2.644

述曰：下破似事，及破共法，於中有二：初總非；後別破。此總非也，前舉火喻難中真火，論主非之，在於心外實法中破，似事之中，有依類，有依實說似。類者，性也，即是同異。其大有句義者，今不取之，何以知者？下破德與類互相離，故知是同異。若大有為類，以是一法決定不相離故，即不成因，類是別義故。實者，即是彼實句義，如地、水、火等。汝今所言，依於似事假說為火，所說假火，依同異類及火等，實皆不成故，此即總非依皆不成。

The Commentary states: Below is the refutation of the resembling entity and the refutation of the shared property, in which there are two parts: first, a general rejection; second, a specific refutation. This is the general rejection. In the previous objection raising the simile of fire, the real fire was rejected by the author of the Treatise, who refuted it in the context of real dharmas external to the mind. Within the resembling entity, some posit resemblance based on genus, while others posit resemblance based on substance. 'Genus' refers to nature, which is [the category of] generic-cum-particular (sāmānya-viśeṣa). As for the category of 'great existence' (sattā), it is not taken here. How is this known? Because below, quality (guṇa) and genus are refuted as mutually dissociated; hence it is known to be generic-cum-particular. If 'great existence' were taken as genus, since it is a single dharma that is definitively not dissociated [from substances], it would not establish the probans (hetu), because 'genus' has a specific sense. 'Substance' refers to their category of substance, such as earth, water, fire, etc. What you now say—that based on a resembling entity one conventionally speaks of 'fire'—whether the conventionally spoken 'fire' is based on the generic-cum-particular genus or on substances such as fire, neither can be established. Thus, this is a general rejection that neither basis can be established.