成唯識論述記 2.674

2.674

述曰：如色法等，礙為自性，火以煖為性，水以濕為性，但可證知，言說不及，第六意識隨五識後起，緣此智發言語等，但是所緣說法之共相，非彼自相。若緣著自相者，如緣張人，即應張人身中諸事皆應了知，緣及張人之自相故。應立量云：如第六意識緣張人時，張人身中餘一切法皆應緣；著張人自相故；如所緣形量等。此就他宗而為此量，非謂共許。張人身以眾多法為自性，緣彼之時但得眾法所成之人，非一一法皆能別知，一一法皆能別知是證量故。言共相者，如言色時遮餘非色，一切色法皆在所言。乃至言青遮非青，一切青皆在所言。貫通諸法，不唯在一事體中，故名共相說為假也。遮得自相名得共相，若所變中有共相法是可得者，即得自體，應一切法可說、可緣，故共相法亦說、緣不及。然非是執，不堅取故。如五蘊中以五蘊事為自相，空、無我等理為共相。分蘊成處，色成於十，處名自相，蘊名共相，一色蘊該十故。於一處中，青、黃等類別，類名自相，處名共相。於一青等類中，有多事體，菓青非華等，以類為共相，事名為自相。一事中有多極微，以事為共相，以極微為自相。如是展轉至不可說為自相，可說極微等為共相。故以理推無自相體，且說不可言法體名自相，可說為共相。以理而論，共既非共，自亦非自，為互遮故，但各別說。說空、無我等是共相者，從假智說，此但有能緣行解，都無所緣真實共體。入真觀時，則一一法皆別了知，非作共解。言說若著自相者，說火之時，火應燒口，火以燒物為自相故。緣亦如是，緣火之時，火應燒心。今不燒心，及不燒口，明緣及說俱得共相。若爾，喚火何不得水，不得火之自相故，如喚於水。此理不然，無始串習，共呼召故。今緣於青作青解者，此比量知不稱前法，如眼識緣色，稱自相故不作色解，後起意識緣色共相，不著色故，遂作青解，遮餘非青之物，遂作青解，非謂青解即稱青事。故《二十唯識》伽他中言：「現覺如夢等，已起現覺時，見及境已無，寧許有現量。」比謂假智唯緣共相而得起故，法之自相離分別故。言說亦爾，不稱本法，亦但只於共相處轉，如說青蓮華等，有所遮故。今大乘宗唯有自相體，都無共相體，假智及詮，但唯得共，不得自相。若說共相唯有觀心，現量通緣自相、共相，若法自相唯現量得，共相亦通比量所得，乃至故言唯於諸法共相而轉，此之自相證量所知，非言說等境故。下文第二、顯假詮智有勝功能。

The Commentary states: Regarding material phenomena and the like, obstruction is their intrinsic nature; fire has heat as its nature, and water has wetness as its nature. These can only be realized by direct cognition; speech cannot reach them. The sixth, mental consciousness arises subsequent to the five consciousnesses; the intellect that conditions this gives rise to speech and the like, but what is cognized is only the universal characteristic of the spoken phenomenon, not its particular characteristic. If it were to grasp the particular characteristic, then, for instance, when conditioning person Zhang, all matters within the body of person Zhang would have to be fully cognized, because [the intellect] would have reached and conditioned the particular characteristic of person Zhang. One should establish a formal syllogism: When the sixth, mental consciousness conditions person Zhang, it must condition all other phenomena within the body of person Zhang; because it grasps the particular characteristic of person Zhang; just like the spatial shape and dimension that are conditioned. This inference is formulated from the standpoint of the other tradition, not as something mutually accepted. The body of person Zhang has many phenomena as its intrinsic nature; when conditioning him, one only grasps the 'person' constituted by these many phenomena, and cannot distinctly know each individual phenomenon, for distinctly knowing each individual phenomenon belongs to direct realization. As for 'universal characteristic': for example, when one says 'matter', this excludes what is other than matter, and all material phenomena are included in what is spoken. Further, when one says 'blue', this excludes what is not blue, and all instances of blue are included in what is spoken. Because it pervades many phenomena and does not reside solely in a single real entity, it is called a universal characteristic and spoken of as nominal. Excluding the attainment of the particular characteristic is called attaining the universal characteristic. If among the manifested images there were a phenomenon of universal characteristic that could be apprehended, that would mean attaining the entity itself, and all phenomena should then be speakable and conditionable; hence phenomena of universal characteristic are also unreachable by speech and conditioning. However, it is not a clinging, because it is not clung to obstinately. For instance, among the five aggregates, the concrete realities of the five aggregates are the particular characteristics, while the principles of emptiness, non-self, and so forth are the universal characteristics. Analyzing the aggregates to form the cognitive bases, matter constitutes ten [bases]; the bases are called particular characteristics, and the aggregate is called the universal characteristic, because the single aggregate of matter subsumes the ten. Within a single cognitive base, there are distinct classes such as blue and yellow; the class is called the particular characteristic, and the base is called the universal characteristic. Within a single class such as blue, there are many concrete entities—a blue fruit is not a [blue] flower, and so on; taking the class as the universal characteristic, the concrete entity is called the particular characteristic. Within a single entity there are many atomic particles; taking the entity as the universal characteristic, the atomic particles are the particular characteristics. Proceeding gradually in this manner until one reaches the inexpressible, that is the particular characteristic, while the expressible atomic particles and the like are universal characteristics. Therefore, when deduced by reason, there is no real entity of a particular characteristic; for the time being, we designate the inexpressible phenomenon-entity as the particular characteristic, and what can be expressed as the universal characteristic. Discussed strictly according to reason, since the universal is not universal, neither is the particular particular; to mutually exclude each other, they are merely spoken of separately. That emptiness, non-self, and so on are called universal characteristics is stated from the standpoint of nominal intellect; this only has an apprehending conceptual understanding, and has no real, universal entity as what is cognized. When entering true contemplation, one distinctly and fully knows each individual phenomenon, without forming a universal conceptualization. If speech were to grasp the particular characteristic, then when one says 'fire', fire should burn the mouth, because burning things is the particular characteristic of fire. Conditioning is also like this: when conditioning fire, fire should burn the mind. Now, since it does not burn the mind and does not burn the mouth, it is clear that both conditioning and speech grasp the universal characteristic. [Objection:] If that is so, why does calling 'fire' not obtain water, since it does not obtain the particular characteristic of fire, just like calling 'water'? This reasoning is incorrect, because of beginningless habituation through which they are conventionally invoked. Now, when one conditions blue and forms the conceptualization of blue, this is an inferential cognition that does not conform to the antecedent phenomenon. Just as the visual consciousness conditions matter, conforming to the particular characteristic and therefore not forming a conceptualization of 'matter', the subsequently arising mental consciousness conditions the universal characteristic of matter; because it does not grasp matter [itself], it thereupon forms the conceptualization of blue, excluding other things that are not blue, and thereupon forms the conceptualization of blue; it does not mean that the conceptualization of blue directly conforms to the concrete entity of blue. Hence, the verse in the Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātra says: 'Direct perception is like in a dream, etc.; / At the time when direct perception has already arisen, / The seeing and the object are already absent; / How can direct perception be admitted?' This means that nominal intellect can arise only by conditioning the universal characteristic, because the particular characteristic of a phenomenon is free from conceptual construction. Speech is also like this: it does not conform to the original phenomenon, and also only operates upon universal characteristics, just as when one says 'blue lotus', there is an exclusion. Now in the Mahāyāna tradition, there are only entities of particular characteristics, and absolutely no entities of universal characteristics. Nominal intellect and expression only grasp the universal, never obtaining the particular characteristic. If one speaks of the universal characteristic, it exists only in the contemplative mind. Direct perception universally conditions both particular characteristics and universal characteristics; if a phenomenon is a particular characteristic, it is attained solely by direct perception, whereas universal characteristics are also accessible to inferential cognition. And so forth; thus it is said that they 'operate only upon the universal characteristics of phenomena.' This particular characteristic is known through direct realization, because it is not an object of speech and the like. Next, the second section reveals that nominal expression and intellect have superior functions.