成唯識論述記 2.687

2.687

述曰：此顯似事非真實有，謂於自相之上，增益共相依他有法，謂一色相通諸色上，故名增益。此通三性心，及於此中，遍計所執此相是無，自相之上妄增為有，隨情說相非稱本境。勿謂善心，亦是有執，不堅取故，執心必違影像相故，共相不違影像相故。能詮之聲依共相轉，不依自相，故說假法不依真起。心變共相外必有體，然與自相必須合緣，如緣色時，亦隨自相變為一共，遍諸色上，故成所緣緣。乃至緣我或空華等，隨作青等解，或依於蘊實法，或別緣兔角等，與有體法並合緣之，故無非所緣緣失，一切准知。又解，即共相別緣亦依他性，然不稱實，仍是有性，成所緣緣。今論所說假我、法者，但隨妄情，非謂別有真論說於假也。

The Commentary states: This shows that resembling entities are not truly existent. That is, upon the particular characteristic, one superimposes the dependent-on-other existent phenomenon of the universal characteristic; that is to say, a single characteristic of matter pervades all matter, and therefore it is called superimposition. This applies to minds of all three moral natures; and within this, what is conceptually constructed by attachment is nonexistent; upon the particular characteristic, it is falsely superimposed as existent, and its mark is spoken of according to subjective sentiment, not conforming to the original object. One should not say that wholesome minds also possess clinging, because they do not obstinately grasp it, and because the clinging mind necessarily contradicts the mark of the mental image, whereas the universal characteristic does not contradict the mark of the mental image. Expressing sound operates in reliance on the universal characteristic and does not rely on the particular characteristic; therefore it is said that nominal phenomena do not arise in reliance on the real. Outside the universal characteristic transformed by the mind, there must be a real entity, yet it must be conditioned jointly with the particular characteristic. For example, when conditioning matter, in accordance with the particular characteristic it also transforms into a single universal that pervades all matter; thus it constitutes an objective condition. And so forth, even when conditioning a self or a sky-flower and the like, whether according to forming conceptualizations such as 'blue', or relying on the real phenomena of the aggregates, or separately conditioning a rabbit's horns and the like, it is conditioned jointly with existent entities; thus there is no error of lacking an objective condition, as should be understood in all cases by analogy. Another explanation is that the separately conditioned universal characteristic is also of dependent on other-nature, yet does not conform to reality; nevertheless, it possesses existence and constitutes an objective condition. Now, the nominal self and phenomena spoken of in the treatise merely follow false sentiment; it does not mean that there are other real treatises that speak of the nominal.