成唯識論述記 2.72

2.72

謂和合於五識是有法，非緣是法也；彼體實無故；猶如第二月，但以義縱和合設為所緣故。文中云：設非第二月亦許所緣，此中但遮有其緣義，不說彼為五所緣故。又第二月依瞿波論師略有二解：一解云唯意識得，此中為五識喻，非緣義等故無過失，以五識是有法所收，同喻無有，無所立失。又以義減文，於有法之中須除五字，直言「和合於識設所緣非緣」為宗，是意所緣故。或除「設所緣」字，但言「和合於識非是緣」為宗，亦得。二解云：第二月空花等相，即眼識等所緣，於中執實等，方是意識。若依此義，空花等色便無本質，亦非法性，故前解勝，護法同前。又所緣是境義，有無俱成，彼文既正，不須減加。其經部師，亦不說五識緣第二月故，論文之中，宗、因及喻准量應知。今不許彼實是所緣，故言「設」也。五識緣長等假法，應有不定過；今釋之言，唯取五識一向緣實，故無違也。然觸處中澁等，即四大分位差別，名之為假，身根所得，不同長等聚集假攝，非眼識等得。說為色處以明了取依眼為門故，若說五識亦緣假者，此是識內，不同他宗，如緣命根等亦是所緣緣，別變為相，依他攝故。或兼實緣，汝之和合識外無法，不可為例，如《對法抄》。

That is, 'the combination with respect to the five consciousnesses' is the subject (dharmin), and 'is not a condition' is the predicate (dharma); 'because its entity is truly non-existent'; 'just like a second moon' is merely by conceptually conceding that the combination is granted to be an object. In the text it says: Even if it is not the case that a second moon is also accepted as an object [of the five], here it merely excludes its having the meaning of a condition, without saying that it is an object of the five. Furthermore, concerning the second moon, there are briefly two explanations according to Master Gopa: One explanation says it is apprehended solely by mental consciousness; its being used here as an example for the five consciousnesses has no fault because of the meaning of not being a condition and so forth, and since the five consciousnesses are subsumed under the subject, the homogeneous example lacks it, so there is no fault of lacking the probandum. Also, by conceptually reducing the text, one must remove the word 'five' from the subject, stating directly: 'The combination, with respect to consciousness, granted it is an object, is not a condition' as the thesis, since it is an object of the mental [consciousness]. Or, removing the words 'granted it is an object', merely stating: 'The combination, with respect to consciousness, is not a condition' as the thesis is also acceptable. The second explanation says: The aspects of a second moon, sky-flowers, and so forth are indeed objects of visual consciousness and so forth; grasping them as real and so forth only then belongs to mental consciousness. If one relies on this meaning, visible forms like sky-flowers would lack an underlying substance (maula-dravya) and would not be the nature of phenomena (dharmatā) either; hence the former explanation is superior, and Dharmapāla agrees with the former. Furthermore, 'object' means the objective sphere, established whether existent or non-existent; since that text is correct, it does not need deletion or addition. The Sautrāntika master also does not say that the five consciousnesses cognize a second moon; hence in the text of the treatise, the thesis, reason, and example should be understood according to the syllogism. Now, not accepting that it is truly an object, it says 'granted'. If the five consciousnesses cognize nominal phenomena like length, there would be the fault of inconclusiveness; now it is explained by saying that we only take the five consciousnesses as strictly cognizing real [phenomena], so there is no contradiction. However, roughness and so forth among the tangible sphere are precisely the differentiated states of the four great elements and are called nominal, apprehended by the body faculty; they are not like the aggregation of nominals subsumed under length and so forth, and are not apprehended by visual consciousness and so forth. They are spoken of as the visible sphere because clear grasping takes the eye as its gateway. If it is said that the five consciousnesses also cognize nominals, this is within consciousness, unlike other schools; just as cognizing the life-faculty and so forth is also an ālambana-pratyaya, separately transforming into an aspect because it is subsumed under the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva). Or it cognizes both real and [nominal]; your combination has no phenomenon outside consciousness, and cannot be used as a parallel, as in the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā.