成唯識論述記 2.744

2.744

述曰：自體是總，因果是別，自相攝持因果二相為自體故。「攝」是包含義，包二為一故；「持」是依持義，以總為別所依持故。別為總所包；總為別所依，故名「攝持」。又離二無總，攝二為體，二是總義。總是義之體，體與義為依，名之為「持」，攝二義為體，名「攝」。問：若爾，自相應是假有。答：此亦不然。若有條然因、果兩相合之為自相，自相可成假；既離自相無別因、果相，因、果相即自體之上別義說之，故非假也。問：前言第八有三位名，何故於三能變之中，乃舉異熟果相之號，於別釋中遂致染分藏識之名？

The Commentary states: The substance of its own self is general, while cause and result are particular; it is because the self-characteristic subsumes and upholds the two characteristics of cause and result as its own substance. 'Subsumes' (she) has the meaning of encompassing, because it encompasses the two into one; 'upholds' (chi) has the meaning of being a support, because the general serves as the support upheld by the particulars. The particulars are encompassed by the general; the general serves as the support for the particulars; hence it is called 'subsuming and upholding'. Moreover, apart from the two there is no general: it subsumes the two as its substance, and the two are the meanings of the general. The general is the substance of the meanings; the substance serves as the support for the meanings, which is called 'upholding'; subsuming the two meanings as its substance is called 'subsuming'. Question: If so, the self-characteristic should be a conceptual existent (prajñaptisat). Answer: This is also not so. If there were two distinctly separate characteristics of cause and result combined to make the self-characteristic, the self-characteristic could indeed be conceptual; but since apart from the self-characteristic there are no separate characteristics of cause and result, and the characteristics of cause and result are merely stated as particular meanings upon its own substance, it is therefore not conceptual. Question: It was stated earlier that the eighth consciousness has three stage-names; why is it that among the three transforming consciousnesses, the designation of the result-characteristic of vipāka was raised, yet in the particular explanation, the name of the defiled part, the store-consciousness, was used?