成唯識論述記 2.890

2.890

又汝若言善、惡業體是一種生，異熟果體是一種生，各一種者，而異熟果現不自熏，但善、惡業現行熏，令果種增長，其種本有。業於果種能令增長，應名因緣，如自業種。但令增長為因緣故，或復業種增名言種，應是因緣。既非因緣故，非增長名曰因緣。果種如業種亦增長故，故非唯本有，亦有新熏。若爾，設俱新熏，豈俱新起俱名因緣？並新生故。此難不齊，如無記心熏無記種，復善、惡業自熏自種，親辨體故。故是因緣，但緣資彼無記種子，故非因緣。汝之種子俱不辨體，但資增長，不辨體齊，故應俱是因緣攝也。

Moreover, if you say the substance of wholesome and unwholesome karma is generated from one kind of seed, and the substance of the vipāka effect is generated from another kind of seed, each having its own seed; yet the actual vipāka effect does not perfume itself, but rather actual wholesome and unwholesome karma perfumes and causes the seed of the effect to augment, while that seed is originally existent—then since karma can cause the seed of the effect to augment, it should be called cause and condition, just like its own karma-seed. For [you claim that] merely causing augmentation constitutes cause and condition; or again, karmic seeds augmenting nominal seeds (nāmasaṃjñā-bīja) should be cause and condition. Since they are not cause and condition, merely augmenting is not called cause and condition. For the effect-seed, like the karma-seed, is also augmented; therefore, seeds are not solely originally existent, but also newly perfumed. If so, suppose both were newly perfumed; would both newly arisen ones be called cause and condition? Because both are newly born. This challenge is not equal: when an indeterminate mind perfumes an indeterminate seed, and wholesome or unwholesome karma perfumes its own seed, they directly accomplish their own substance; hence they are cause and condition. But karma merely assists that indeterminate seed, so it is not cause and condition. In your view, neither of the seeds accomplishes a substance; they merely assist augmentation. Since their failure to accomplish a substance is equal, both should be included under cause and condition.