成唯識論述記 3.170

3.170

述曰：或自境如餘境亦不緣，或餘境如自境亦應緣，即此二喻各通前量；或論中二量，次第配之，初屬上，後屬下。此義意言，緣此自境時，心上必有帶境之相，如鏡面上似面相生，方名所緣，不爾，便有如前說過。除正量等外，所餘部共大乘同，而真如無似境之相，如下所緣緣中自會。此破所緣無訖，次破無能緣見，然《佛地論》第三四智三諍，但論相分有無，不論見分，即與此別，下第九中自當解釋。

The Commentary states: Either one's own object would be like other objects and also not be cognized, or other objects would be like one's own object and also should be cognized; thus these two examples each apply to the previous inferences. Alternatively, the two inferences in the treatise correspond in sequence: the first belongs to the former, and the second belongs to the latter. The meaning here says that when cognizing this own object, there must be an aspect on citta bearing the object, just as an appearance resembling a face arises on the surface of a mirror; only then is it called an object of cognition. If not, there would be the faults stated before. Except for the Saṃmatīya and others, the remaining schools agree with the Mahāyāna, whereas tathatā lacks an aspect resembling an object, as will be naturally harmonized below under objective condition. This concludes the refutation of the absence of the cognized [division]; next is the refutation of the absence of the cognizing darśana. However, the third fascicle of the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra in discussing the three disputes regarding the four wisdoms merely debates the presence or absence of the nimittabhāga, not the darśanabhāga, which differs from this; it will naturally be explained below in the ninth fascicle.