成唯識論述記 3.174

3.174

述曰：此返難云：汝虛空等應是能緣；無能緣相故；如心心所。古大乘師即安惠等，既如是立二分俱無，論下自說。清辨亦云：若約勝義，諸法皆空；唯有虛偽；如幻化等。若約世俗，見、相俱有，許有外境，故非唯識。識離於境，有何體用？故知諸法有境無心。若言心等有緣作用，許有實作用，便非釋子，亦違聖教，今且違汝一切唯境，故能緣相決定是無，小乘諸師此相皆有。此義意言，心心所生，必有能緣之相，如鏡必有能照之相，不爾，便有如前說過。不同外道、小乘有實作用，體仍非無，此中比量，准之可解。若爾，即鏡應名能緣，如下所緣緣中說，第一別破正量部等；第二別破清辨；合破安惠，下引經證。

The Commentary states: This counter-challenge says: "Your space and the like should be capable of cognizing; because they lack the mark of being capable of cognizing; like mind and mental factors." The ancient Mahāyāna masters, namely Sthiramati and others, having thus established that both parts are non-existent, [their view] will be stated below in the treatise itself. Bhāviveka also says: "From the perspective of the ultimate truth, all phenomena are empty, existing merely as illusory deceptions, like magical illusions and transformations. From the perspective of conventional truth, both darśana[-bhāga] and nimitta[-bhāga] exist, and an external object is accepted; therefore, it is not vijñapti-mātra. If consciousness is separated from the object, what essence or function could it have? Therefore, know that all phenomena have objects but no mind." If one says that the mind and the like have an active function of cognizing, accepting a real active function, then one is not a son of the Śākya [clan], and it also contradicts the holy teachings. Now, for the time being, it contradicts your [claim that] all is only object; therefore, the mark of being capable of cognizing is definitely non-existent. The various masters of the Hīnayāna all maintain that this mark exists. The meaning of this explanation is: when mind and mental factors arise, they must have the mark of being capable of cognizing, just as a mirror must have the mark of being capable of illuminating; otherwise, there would be the fault stated previously. It is unlike the heterodox and Hīnayāna views of having a real active function, yet its essence is not non-existent; the inference here can be understood accordingly. If that were so, then a mirror should be called 'capable of cognizing'; this is addressed below in [the section on] the objective condition (ālambanapratyaya). The first specifically refutes the Saṃmatīya and others; the second specifically refutes Bhāviveka; jointly they refute Sthiramati; below, sūtras are cited as proof.