成唯識論述記 3.208

3.208

述曰：諸體自緣，皆證自相，果亦唯現。見緣相分，或量、非量，故不應言見分為果，不可非量法為現量果故，故不可見分或緣於相是比、非量，返緣自證復是現量。難曰：見分緣相或量，或非量，一向現量自證分以為果，何妨自證唯現量能量，亦得比量，或非以為果？解曰：現量心自體，比、非量果可唯現，比、非二種非證體，何得能為現量果？現量為比果，比不為現果，問答亦然，外內難、緣縛難例亦然。見緣相為縛，自證應亦爾，是縛無失，然唯現量，如五識境縛，仍是現量收，證自體故；為是煩惱染污相故，如末那章。夫證自體必現量攝，故不可說見分緣相，或量、非量為自證果，不可見分一時之中為量、非量，以相違故。縱許見分或比、非量為第三果，亦不定故，現量為果義即定故。一心之中相違不可或量、非量，故立第四義亦如前。

The Commentary states: When any entity cognizes itself, it always realizes its own particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), and the result (phala) is also exclusively direct perception (pratyakṣa). Because the darśanabhāga cognizes the nimittabhāga, it is either a valid cognition (pramāṇa) or an invalid cognition (apramāṇa); therefore, one should not say that the darśanabhāga is the result, because an invalid cognitive factor cannot serve as the result of direct perception. Thus, one cannot say that the darśanabhāga, having cognized the nimittabhāga by inference (anumāna) or invalid cognition, can turn back to cognize the svasaṃvittibhāga and thereby be direct perception. Objection: The darśanabhāga's cognition of the nimittabhāga is either valid or invalid, yet it takes the exclusively direct-perceptual svasaṃvittibhāga as its result; what prevents the svasaṃvittibhāga—which is exclusively a direct-perceptual means of valid cognition (pramāṇa)—from also having inference or invalid cognition as its result? Explanation: As the self-entity of a direct-perceptual mind, the result of inference or invalid cognition can be exclusively direct perception; but how could inference and invalid cognition, neither being an entity of self-realization, serve as the result of direct perception? Direct perception can be the result of inference, but inference is not the result of direct perception. The question and reply are likewise; the objection regarding external and internal, and the objection regarding binding to the object (ālambanabandhana), are also analogous. If the darśanabhāga's cognizing the nimittabhāga constitutes bondage, the svasaṃvittibhāga should also be so; even if it is bondage, there is no flaw, for it remains exclusively direct perception, just as the bondage to the objects of the five consciousnesses is still subsumed under direct perception because it realizes its own entity; this is because it is the mark defiled by afflictions, as explained in the section on manas. Now, realizing one's own entity must be subsumed under direct perception. Therefore, one cannot say that the darśanabhāga, which cognizes the nimittabhāga and is either valid or invalid, serves as the result of the svasaṃvittibhāga; for the darśanabhāga cannot be simultaneously valid and invalid within a single moment, because they are contradictory. Even if it were granted that the darśanabhāga, being an inference or invalid cognition, serves as the result of the third part, this is still indeterminate; whereas the meaning of direct perception serving as the result is determinate. Within a single mind, contradictory states cannot be alternately valid or invalid; hence establishing the fourth part also has the meaning explained before.