成唯識論述記 3.212

3.212

述曰：其義可知，縱緣於心，以心為相，亦唯所緣，相分之心不能緣故。問：見分緣外，從境名外；見分緣唯所緣，從唯所緣名所緣？答曰：此義亦可然，此文影顯，故無有失，為色等難，皆應准思。今意欲顯由見緣外，不得返緣立第四分，故立外名，理實非外。因論生論，自證緣見，應相分心不能緣慮，所緣心故，如相分心。此義不然，自證緣見一能緣上，義別分故。若為相分心，必非一能緣體故，或別人心，或前後心，由此必非能緣性故。見分等心，故能緣慮，相心不然，謂第二分以第三為果，自為能量；第三緣見，以第四為果，能量可知。緣第四時以誰為果？不可即以第四為果，如緣見分，見分非果，此義應思，即以所緣第四為果，第四緣第三為果，例此同故，功能應爾。若更立者，過無窮故。唯爾所者，分限足故，如無色界本識見分緣種子等，更無餘相，種子搏附識自體分，即以自證為相分緣，緣彼種故。然不緣彼自體分上能緣功能，過如前說，仍以第三自證為果，此例應同。

The Commentary states: Its meaning is clear. Even when it cognizes the mind and takes the mind as the nimitta, it is also solely the object of cognition, because the mind that is the nimittabhāga cannot cognize. Question: The darśanabhāga cognizes the external, and is named 'external' from the object; since the darśanabhāga cognizes what is solely the object of cognition, should it be named the 'object of cognition' from what is solely the object of cognition? Answer: This meaning could also be so; this text implies it indirectly, so there is no fault. Objections regarding form (rūpa) and the like should all be considered in accordance with this. What is intended to be shown now is that because the darśanabhāga cognizes the external, it cannot turn back to cognize [internally], requiring the establishment of the fourth part; thus the designation 'external' is established, though in truth it is not external. Following the debate further: when the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizes the darśanabhāga, should the mind that is the nimittabhāga be unable to cognize and reflect because it is an objective mind, like the mind that is the nimittabhāga? This meaning is incorrect, because the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizes the darśanabhāga within a single cognitive subject, differentiated merely by meaning. If it serves as the mind that is a nimittabhāga, it definitely does not share one cognitive entity, as it is either another person's mind or a preceding or succeeding moment of mind; hence it is definitely not of a cognitive nature. The mind as the darśanabhāga and so on can therefore cognize and reflect, whereas the objective mind cannot. That is to say, the second part takes the third as its result and is itself the means of cognition; when the third cognizes the darśanabhāga, it takes the fourth as its result, and its status as a means of cognition is evident. When it cognizes the fourth, what does it take as its result? It cannot directly take the fourth as its result, just as when it cognizes the darśanabhāga, the darśanabhāga is not the result. This meaning should be considered: it directly takes the cognized fourth as its result, and when the fourth cognizes the third, it takes the third as its result; by this analogy, their functions are naturally so. If one were to establish further parts, there would be the fault of an infinite regress. There are only this many, because this division of limits is sufficient. For instance, when the darśanabhāga of the root consciousness in the formless realm cognizes the seeds and so forth without any other marks, the seeds adhere to the self-entity part of consciousness, so it takes the svasaṃvitti as the nimittabhāga to cognize, because it cognizes those seeds. However, it does not cognize the cognitive function upon that self-entity part, for the fault would be as explained before; yet it still takes the third, the svasaṃvitti, as its result. This case should be analogous.