成唯識論述記 3.269

3.269

述曰：謂即三性有漏種子俱是所緣。「此識性攝故」，謂「性」者，體也，體即本識，種子是用，如前已說，諸法體用，理應爾故，用是體攝。又言「性」者，謂是性類，其並有漏，以類同故，不相違背，得為所緣。又「性」者，性也，若住本識，同無記性，故能緣之，然是識之相分所攝，如前已說。若據前緣器中三說，若言緣種是相分者，第三師正義也，無色界本識，唯緣內種故，不緣器等。若據前二師義，無色亦但約緣種說，以無身故，實亦緣器，今非彼義，不可用之。無色緣種，亦有解云：即為自體分，見分緣器故，彼據自體分，故言唯緣種。前師問：種是識自體，即為相分緣，真如即自證，亦應相分緣？答：彼識性故，此非識性。識上功能，為相分緣，不同如也。設佛見分緣於自證，作影像緣，不爾，便無四分之義，故下第八唯除見分非相所緣，許見分亦緣自證分等，但不親證，影變亦得。難此解云：有漏種子依自體分，識即緣之；無漏之種亦依自體，識為緣不？

The Commentary states: This means that contaminated seeds of the three natures are all cognitive objects. 'Because they are subsumed under the nature of this consciousness': 'nature' means essence; the essence is the fundamental consciousness, and the seeds are its functions. As explained previously, regarding the essence and function of all dharmas, principle should dictate this; the function is subsumed under the essence. Furthermore, 'nature' means class of nature; they are all contaminated, and because their category is the same, they are not mutually contradictory and can serve as cognitive objects. Moreover, 'nature' refers to moral nature: when abiding in the fundamental consciousness, they share the indeterminate nature, and thus it can cognize them; yet they are subsumed under the nimittabhāga of consciousness, as previously explained. According to the three theories on cognizing the vessel world discussed earlier, if one says that taking seeds as cognitive objects belongs to the nimittabhāga, this is the correct doctrine of the third master: because the fundamental consciousness of the formless realm only takes internal seeds as cognitive object, it does not cognize the vessel and so on. According to the doctrine of the first two masters, the formless realm is also spoken of merely in terms of cognizing seeds because there is no physical body, but in reality it also cognizes the vessel; we now reject their view and it cannot be adopted. Regarding cognizing seeds in the formless realm, there is also an explanation: they are precisely the svasaṃvittibhāga, while the darśanabhāga cognizes the vessel; that was stated in reference to the svasaṃvittibhāga, which is why it is said to cognize seeds only. The former master asks: If seeds are the very essence of consciousness and yet are cognized as the nimittabhāga, should tathatā, being the svasaṃvitti, also be cognized as a nimittabhāga? Answer: That is the nature of consciousness, whereas this is not the nature of consciousness. A functional capacity upon consciousness is cognized as a nimittabhāga, unlike tathatā. Even if the Buddha's darśanabhāga cognizes svasaṃvitti, it cognizes it by producing a reflection; otherwise, there would be no doctrine of the four divisions. Therefore, below in the eighth fascicle, except that the darśanabhāga is not cognized as an objective nimitta, it is admitted that the darśanabhāga also cognizes the svasaṃvittibhāga and so on, but without direct realization, transforming a reflection is also permissible. An objection is raised against this explanation: Contaminated seeds rely on the svasaṃvittibhāga and consciousness immediately cognizes them; uncontaminated seeds also rely on the svasaṃvitti, so does consciousness cognize them or not?