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成唯識論述記 3.275

成唯識論述記 3.275

Language
Classical Chinese

3.275

問:第七識緣,但分別有無實用者,即五識、色等應無質礙。此中問答,不緣識中,自當分別。難一師云:若本識所變皆有實用,變他根等,應為識依,有實用故,如自眼根應設功勞;他之實根,心外法故,所變之根便無實用。若亦為他依,便緣心外法,此緣他法,但似彼根,非實有用,若變自法即實有用。問:如變他色等,似他色等言有用;變他身根等,似他根等,應有實用?答:此亦為例,變似他色等,實非他有用;變似他根等,亦非他有用。若爾,變似他色等,於己實有用;變似他根時,於己有何用?於己有實用,應為自識依,有實用故,如變自根,此應思度。若為自受用,變似他根,他根於己亦名有用,此義不然,豈於他根己能受用?以無用故,不變他根。故知下文第二說勝,於不緣心等,由此即無妨。二執受中,上解種子訖,次解有根身。

Question: If that which the seventh consciousness conditions is merely a conceptual discrimination without real practical function, then the five consciousnesses, form, and so forth would be devoid of physical obstruction. As to the questions and answers on this, they will be distinguished in their own right [later], under [the discussion of] not conditioning consciousness. Refuting the first master, [one may] argue: If everything manifested by the fundamental consciousness has real practical function, then in manifesting another's indriyas and so forth, they should serve as bases for consciousness, because they would have real practical function—just as one's own eye indriya must perform its task. But another person's real indriya is an external phenomenon outside the mind, so the indriya manifested [by one's own mind] would lack real practical function. If it were also to serve as a basis for the other [person], then one would be conditioning a phenomenon outside the mind; conditioning another's phenomenon merely resembles their indriya, without being genuinely functional, whereas if it manifests one's own phenomenon, it is genuinely functional. Question: Just as when manifesting another's form and so on, it is said to be functional by resembling the other's form, should not manifesting another's body indriya and so forth, resembling the other's indriyas, likewise have real practical function? Answer: This too serves as an illustration: manifesting a resemblance to another's form and so on is not genuinely functional for the other; manifesting a resemblance to another's indriyas and so on is likewise not genuinely functional for the other. If so, manifesting a resemblance to another's form and so on is genuinely functional for oneself; but when manifesting a resemblance to another's indriyas, what function does it have for oneself? If it were to have real practical function for oneself, it ought to serve as the basis for one's own consciousness, because it would have real practical function, just like manifesting one's own indriya. This should be deliberated upon. If one were to manifest a resemblance to another's indriya for one's own enjoyment, and another's indriya were also called functional for oneself, this meaning is untenable. How could one make use of another's indriya? Because it is useless, one does not manifest another's indriya. Therefore, one knows that the second explanation below is superior, and concerning not conditioning the mind and so forth, it is thereby unhindered. Under the second [heading], 'appropriation' (upātta), the explanation of seeds above is concluded; next is the explanation of the physical body possessing indriyas.

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