成唯識論述記 3.299

3.299

問曰：本識豈不緣極略等四色？答曰：以假故不緣，如不相應法。問曰：彼何以假？無實體故，如《對法》第一、五十四等，極略、極逈但是第六意識分折為極微故，第八不緣。受所引色中，若定、道共色，即此不緣，唯以現行思為體故；別解表業，此亦不緣，以亦思故；無表色可爾，是思種故，既緣諸種，故得緣之。若爾，如二無心定等，皆依種立，應亦得緣。由此，即是心等種上差別功能，但緣種體，不緣別能；即不緣者，無表亦爾，是思種上差別功能，亦是防色之別能故，故知如彼，亦不得緣。遍計所起色，若說唯是鏡像、水月，此亦不緣，唯第六識遍計起故。若唯意緣，通根、塵者，亦此中攝故。第八所緣諸根、塵等，以總從別，以暗從明，皆本處攝故，說不緣遍計所起之色。又定所生色中，如十一切處觀，亦此中攝，第八緣不？答曰：不緣，假想色故，故此論文但緣實色，不緣假故。第八所緣必有用故，彼無實用，第八不緣。然諸法體，一者有法，二者無法，上二法中第八何故不緣無法？此任運緣，非分別故，無籌度故。後得智等有籌度故；諸六識等有分別故，由此故知，第八識體不緣我也。第八識變，變必有用，故不緣無，無無用故，故不緣我等，以無體用故。於有法中略有二種，一者有為；二者無為，何故此識不緣無為？若實無為，因未證故；若假無為，無體用故，皆不得緣。於有為中色、心心所、不相應行，如前已辨，緣實非假等。何故不緣心心所法、不相應行，故外人問。

One asks: Does the fundamental consciousness not take the four kinds of matter such as extremely subtle matter as objects? Answer: Because they are nominal, it does not take them as objects, like the non-associated phenomena. One asks: Why are they nominal? Because they have no real substance, as in the Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya fascicle one, [Yogācārabhūmi] fascicle fifty-four, and so forth; extremely subtle matter and extremely remote matter are merely broken down into atoms by the sixth consciousness, so the eighth does not take them as objects. Among matter induced by vows, as for matter concurrent with samādhi and the path, this [eighth consciousness] does not take it as an object, because its substance is exclusively active cetanā; prātimokṣa vijñapti-karma is also not taken as an object by it, because it is also cetanā; avijñapti-rūpa may be permissible, as it is seeds of cetanā, and since it takes all seeds as objects, it can take it as an object. If so, like the two non-conceptual samāpattis, which are established based on seeds, it should also be able to take them as objects. Therefore, since these are distinct capacities on the seeds of mind and so forth, it takes only the substance of the seeds as an object, not the distinct capacities; if it does not take them as objects, avijñapti is also like this, being a distinct capacity on the seeds of cetanā and also a distinct capacity to prevent physical wrongdoing; thus we know that, like them, it also cannot be taken as an object. As for matter produced by imputation, if one says it is only reflections in mirrors or the moon in water, this is also not taken as an object, because it is produced exclusively by the conceptual imputation of the sixth consciousness. If it is an object exclusively of the mental consciousness and extends to sense faculties and sense-objects, it is also subsumed here. The various sense faculties, sense-objects, and so forth that are objects of the eighth, subsuming the general under the specific, and the obscure under the luminous, are all subsumed under their original āyatanas; hence it is said that it does not take matter produced by imputation as an object. Furthermore, among matter produced by samādhi, such as the contemplations of the ten kṛtsnāyatanas, which are also subsumed here: does the eighth take them as objects or not? Answer: It does not take them as objects, because they are matter of imaginary visualization; hence this treatise text says that it takes only real matter as an object, not nominal matter. What is taken as an object by the eighth must possess function; since those lack real function, the eighth does not take them as objects. However, among the substances of phenomena, the first are existent phenomena, and the second are non-existent phenomena; between these two phenomena, why does the eighth not take non-existent phenomena as objects? Because it takes objects spontaneously, not through conceptual discrimination, and without deliberation. The pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna and so forth possess deliberation; the six consciousnesses and so forth possess conceptual discrimination; from this we know that the substance of the eighth consciousness does not take a self as an object. When the eighth consciousness transforms, what it transforms must have function; hence it does not take non-existence as an object, because non-existence has no function; hence it does not take the self and so forth as objects, because they have neither substance nor function. Among existent phenomena, there are briefly two kinds: (1) conditioned; (2) unconditioned. Why does this consciousness not take the unconditioned as an object? If it is the real unconditioned, because it has not yet been realized in the causal stage; if it is the nominal unconditioned, because it has neither substance nor function; neither can be taken as an object. Among conditioned phenomena: matter, mind, mental factors, and citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras; as analyzed before, it takes the real as object, not the nominal, etc. Why does it not take minds, mental factors, and citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras as objects? Hence the opponent asks: