成唯識論述記 3.365

3.365

述曰：下會相違，謂三和位引觸起時，根變異力勝餘二種，故《集論》等但說分別根之變異，不說分別識、境變異。今言「等」者，等取《雜集》。復言根之第六轉者，顯變異是根體之用。《對法論》中以根用勝但分別根，仍不分別根功能盡，唯能領似順生三受所有功能，以受是觸近所生故。《辨中邊論》第一卷云「觸能分別，根．境．識三順三受故」，分別生三受，同《對法》文。分別根、境、識稍寬《對法》，皆有順生三受相故。此中通取似一切能，最為盡理。又彼論中言分別者，是分別義，根等有能生三受分位，觸能分別令三位珠，分三位別故名分別，今此解好。問：何故三和，唯根獨勝？答：一由主故，有珠勝能名之為主。二由近故，能近生心及心所也。三由遍故，不唯生心所，亦能生心故。四由續故，常相續有，境、識不爾。故境體雖能生心心所，以非主故，又非近故，偏闕二義，不名為勝。心雖是主，近生心所，不能生心，不自生故非遍也，闕遍一義故非勝。境、識皆不續，識有境生，故俱闕續義，非得勝名，唯根獨勝。問：觸之功能如前可解，豈不能與心等同緣，唯此分量名為觸耶？

The Commentary states: Below, it reconciles the contradiction. That is, at the stage of the harmony of the three when contact is induced to arise, the modifying power of the faculty is superior to the other two; therefore the Samuccaya and other texts only speak of discriminating the modification of the faculty, not of discriminating the modification of consciousness and object. Here, the word 'etc.' includes the Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā. Again, using the genitive case 'of the faculty' indicates that modification is a function of the substance of the faculty. In the Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya, because the faculty's function is superior, it only discriminates the faculty, yet it still does not exhaustively discriminate the faculty's capacities; it only receives and resembles all capacities that conform to generating the three feelings, because feeling is what is directly produced by contact. The first fascicle of the Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra states: 'Contact can discriminate because the three—faculty, object, and consciousness—conform to the three feelings'; discriminating the generation of the three feelings is identical to the text of the Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya. Discriminating faculty, object, and consciousness is somewhat broader than the Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya, because all have the aspect of conforming to generating the three feelings. Taking it here generally as resembling all capacities is the most thorough explanation. Furthermore, what is called 'discrimination' in that treatise has the sense of distinguishing: the faculty and the others have the distinct states of being able to produce the three feelings, and contact can discriminate them so that the three states are distinct; distinguishing the three states differently is therefore called discrimination. This explanation is excellent. Question: The capacity of contact can be understood as above; can it not also cognize the same object as the mind, etc., or is only this portion called contact?