成唯識論述記 3.405

3.405

述曰：解「起愛為業」，謂於樂受未得希合，已得復有不乖離欲；於苦未得，有不合欲，已得之中有乖離欲。欲者欣求，即通三性。此業可通有漏、無漏，今唯依無明觸所生受故。此唯是愛，依染分說，如緣起中受緣愛故，有漏受能為愛之緣故。此釋一切染愛作業，非第八識，不生愛故。又第八俱受，疎起六識中愛，義亦無妨，受善、惡境起諸愛故，如想起言，疎亦起故。欲非遍行，不決定起，故受業用非是遍理。此五數中，唯受、想業約勝能說，餘之三業乃是遍能。然大乘中雖領於觸，約領境勝，以立受體，故薩婆多亦領於境，及同時觸；故《俱舍》說受領隨觸。正理論師有二種受，評取領觸是受自性，故論破之。

The Commentary states: In explaining that 'arousing craving is its activity': regarding pleasant sensation, prior to attaining [the object] one wishes to unite with it, and having attained it, one furthermore has the desire not to be separated from it; regarding painful [sensation], prior to attaining it, one has the desire not to unite with it, and having attained it, one has the desire to be separated from it. 'Desire' is eager seeking, which extends across all three natures. This activity may extend to both sāsrava and anāsrava; here, it is explained solely on the basis of sensation arisen from contact with ignorance. Because this is solely craving, it is spoken of in terms of the defiled category—as in dependent origination, where 'sensation conditions craving', because sāsrava sensation can serve as a condition for craving. This explains the operation of all defiled craving, and not that of the eighth consciousness, because [the eighth consciousness] does not arouse craving. Furthermore, there is no fault in the principle that the sensation concomitant with the eighth [consciousness] indirectly arouses craving in the sixth consciousness, because in experiencing wholesome and unwholesome objects it arouses various cravings—just as perception gives rise to words, which it also arouses indirectly. Desire is not an omnipresent mental factor (sarvatraga) and does not arise invariably; therefore, the active function of sensation is not an omnipresent principle. Among these five mental factors, only the activities of sensation and perception are stated in terms of their superior capacities; the activities of the remaining three are indeed omnipresent capacities. However, in the Mahāyāna, although [sensation] experiences contact, the substantial entity of sensation is established in terms of its superiority in experiencing the object. For the Sarvāstivādin as well, it experiences the object and simultaneous contact; thus the Kośa states that 'sensation experiences the contact that conforms to it'. The Masters of the *Nyāyānusāra* maintain two kinds of sensation, and their definitive judgment takes experiencing contact to be the intrinsic nature of sensation; therefore the treatise refutes it.