成唯識論述記 3.417

3.417

述曰：正難於彼。如果穀子，似因粟故，等流果等應皆受性，以似因故，猶如於受。謂有果法不似於因，如粟莖等言果似因，為簡於彼，或即因是果，或似因之果。復為簡彼，論說之言，第六轉攝，此難體破。彼返質云：受領於觸，即緣俱生；觸領根等，應緣根等。此不為例，觸不唯以領根為自相，令心心所同觸於境是觸之用，汝宗唯以領觸為受自相，何得不緣？不說緣境之行相故。五、彼若救言，體是心所，似俱因觸，說名為受。粟等似因，體非心所，等流果法及餘心所不似俱觸，互闕一義，故皆非受。何得以餘例難？同受故。

The Commentary states: Directly challenging them. If, like millet grain resembling its cause, the millet seed, nisyanda-phala and so forth should all be of the nature of sensation, because they resemble their causes, just like sensation. That is, there are effects that do not resemble their causes, such as the millet stalk, etc.; the phrase 'effects resembling their causes' is to exclude those. Alternatively, the cause itself is the effect, or it is an effect resembling the cause; to further exclude these, the treatise's phrasing uses the genitive case (ṣaṣṭhī). This challenge refutes the entity. They cross-examine in return: Sensation experiencing contact means cognizing what co-arises; then contact experiencing the sense faculties and so forth should mean cognizing the faculties and so forth. This is not an analogous case: contact does not have experiencing the sense faculties as its sole self-characteristic; causing citta and caitasikas together to contact the object is the function of contact. Your school solely takes experiencing contact to be the self-characteristic of sensation, so how could it not cognize it? For you do not say that its ākāra cognizes the object. Fifth, if they rescue [their view] by saying: Its entity is a caitasika, and resembling its simultaneous cause, contact, it is called sensation; millet and the like resemble their cause, but their entities are not caitasikas, and nisyanda-phala dharmas as well as the other caitasikas do not resemble simultaneous contact; thus each lacks one of the meanings, and therefore none of them is sensation. How could one use the others as an analogous challenge? Because they are identical with sensation.