成唯識論述記 3.429

3.429

述曰：正破彼執。由一切法皆不捨離自體相故，應皆名受。設彼救言，要心所法不捨自性，方名為受，餘思、想等應立受名。若言要有所緣，領觸所生受之自體，名自性受。一一過難，皆同前破。次第十一彼設難言，受領於因，不得名受。觸似三和，應不名觸。十二答曰：此難不然，觸似三和復能令心等同觸於境，故別名為觸。汝今但執受能領似因觸名受，不依境界以立受名，如何以受令觸義同。

The Commentary states: Directly refuting their position. Since all dharmas do not abandon their own entities and characteristics, they should all be called sensation. If they rescue [their view] by saying that only when a caitasika does not abandon its intrinsic nature is it called sensation, then the other [caitasikas such as] volition (cetanā), perception (saṃjñā), and so forth should also be designated as sensation. If they say that there must be an object of cognition, and that experiencing the entity of sensation produced by contact is called 'sensation of intrinsic nature', each and every fallacy is identical to the refutations above. Eleventh, they pose a challenge, saying: If sensation experiencing its cause cannot be called sensation, then contact resembling the coming together of the three should not be called contact. Twelfth, [the author] answers: This challenge is incorrect. Contact resembles the coming together of the three and furthermore can cause mind and so forth to contact the object together, so it is distinctly called contact. You now merely hold that sensation experiencing and resembling its cause, contact, is called sensation, without establishing the name 'sensation' based on the object; how can you equate the meaning of contact with that of sensation?