成唯識論述記 3.433

3.433

述曰：此義如何？能領順、違、俱非境相，定屬已者，名境界受。謂餘心等但取所緣，不謂定令境攝屬己，於順、違等行相淺近，不攝為己有故，皆不名受，如多人共處，傍有人言汝面是奴，中有奴者攝為罵己，餘非奴者不攝屬己，故受亦然，領於境界定屬己故。領境界名不通餘法，何勞虛搆取自性受。問：受領於觸，應名分別，設爾無失。如是所明前三心所，樂大乘者應對餘宗及餘論文知其勝劣。

The Commentary states: What does this mean? Being able to experience favorable, adverse, and neither [favorable nor adverse] objective marks, definitely apprehending them as belonging to oneself, is called 'objective sensation'. That is, the other cittas and so forth merely grasp the cognitive object, but do not definitely make the object belong to oneself; their ākāras regarding the favorable, adverse, and so forth are superficial and proximate, and because they do not take them as their own possession, none is called sensation. This is like many people living together: someone nearby says, 'Your face is that of a slave.' Among them, one who is a slave takes it as insulting himself, whereas the others who are not slaves do not take it as applying to themselves. Sensation is just like this, because in experiencing the cognitive object it definitely appropriates it to itself. The name 'experiencing the cognitive object' does not extend to other dharmas; why labor to construct artificially the taking of a 'sensation of intrinsic nature'? Question: Sensation experiencing contact should be called discrimination (vikalpa); even if so, there is no fault. The preceding three caitasikas having been clarified in this way, those who delight in the Mahāyāna should compare them against other schools and other treatises to know their strengths and weaknesses.