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成唯識論述記 3.519

成唯識論述記 3.519

Language
Classical Chinese

3.519

述曰:此師意說,例於識體,五種義同。一、異熟;二、所緣、行相俱不可知;三、緣三種境;四、五法相應;五、無覆無記。前雖已有本識八門,隨其所應,故但有五。於十義中,此別開不可知為一門,然但有四,除自相、一切種及行相,并捨受俱,因果不斷,轉捨時位,在例後明,此例以前,如其所應,亦如是故。問:本識五法俱,觸等亦如是,觸雖不與觸自相應,五法是同,隨應相例。本識行相即是了別,觸隨所應,應例行相,令心心所同觸前境,是觸行相故,餘例難亦然。答:餘門通故,可咸相例。行相既言了別,何得觸等例同?此不成救,與識相應,既言觸等,觸等亦應與自俱故,此理不然。隨所應有觸、非觸俱,相應有五法,五法相應例得同,了別在識不通餘,何得觸等例行相?了別行相在於識,亦令觸等例皆同,與捨相應不在受,亦應受等例成失。此上二說,義雖未周,以理而言,亦無妨難。

The Commentary states: This master's intention is to say that, patterned on the substance of consciousness, five meanings are identical: first, maturation; second, both the cognitive object and the cognitive representation are unknowable; third, cognizing three kinds of objects; fourth, associated with the five dharmas; fifth, non-obscured indeterminate. Although previously there were eight gates of the fundamental consciousness, in accordance with their applicability, there are only five. Among the ten meanings, this master separately opens 'unknowable' as a single gate, but there are only four: excluding self-characteristic, possessing all seeds, cognitive representation, as well as association with neutral feeling, uninterrupted cause and effect, and the state of abandonment upon transformation, which are explained after this analogy. Before this analogy, in accordance with what is applicable, they are 'also like this'. Question: The fundamental consciousness is accompanied by the five dharmas, and touch and so forth are also like this. Although touch is not associated with touch itself, the five dharmas are identical, drawing an analogy according to applicability. The cognitive representation of the fundamental consciousness is discernment; touch, according to its applicability, should pattern its cognitive representation so that citta and caitasikas touch the object before them simultaneously, which is the cognitive representation of touch; other analogical objections are also like this. Answer: Because the other gates are general, they can all be patterned by analogy. Since cognitive representation is specified as discernment, how could touch and so forth be patterned after it? This defense fails: since association with consciousness is said to be touch and so forth, touch and so forth should also be accompanied by themselves; this reasoning does not hold. According to what is applicable, there is accompaniment by touch and non-touch; association involves five dharmas, and association with five dharmas can be patterned by analogy; discernment resides in consciousness and does not extend to others—how could touch and so forth pattern cognitive representation? If the cognitive representation of discernment resides in consciousness and also causes touch and so forth to be patterned alike, then being associated with neutral feeling would not reside in feeling, and feeling and so forth would also fall into error. Although the above two explanations are not yet exhaustive, when considered in terms of principle, there are no difficulties.

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