成唯識論述記 3.576

3.576

述曰：此顯正義。由此理故，前句所說一切種言，定目本識有彼受熏、能持種義，不目緣種、似種等義，故不可以觸等五數緣種為例。若不是說受熏、持種名一切種爾者，本頌乃有重言之失，上解一切種已言緣種，下解執受中復言緣種故。若彼救言緣種子者，名一切種，執受處中說有根身，無重過者，理亦不然。世親《攝論》第一引《阿毘達磨經》言：執受有二，一、五色根及根依處；二、相名分別習氣。種子可執，復是所緣，與身別明，此有何位，故所說非也。二十二第三師問：若不如我所說義者，亦如是言，應有簡別，以不許例持諸種故。

The Commentary states: This demonstrates the correct meaning. By this principle, the expression 'possessing all seeds' in the preceding verse definitely designates that the root consciousness has the meaning of receiving perfuming and being able to sustain seeds, not the meaning of taking seeds as cognitive objects, semblance-seeds, and so forth; therefore, one cannot take the five caitasikas of contact and so forth taking seeds as cognitive objects as an analogy. If 'possessing all seeds' did not mean receiving perfuming and sustaining seeds, the root verse would commit the fault of tautology, because explaining 'possessing all seeds' above would have already spoken of taking seeds as cognitive objects, and explaining appropriation below would again speak of taking seeds as cognitive objects. If he rescues by saying that taking seeds as cognitive objects is called 'possessing all seeds', while in appropriation and resting-place it speaks of having the bodily faculties, thus incurring no fault of repetition, that is also logically unsound. Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha, fascicle one, cites the Abhidharma-sūtra, saying: 'Appropriation is twofold: first, the five physical sense faculties and the bases of the faculties; second, the vāsanā of attachment to marks and names.' Seeds can be appropriated and are also cognitive objects, explained separately from the body; what place would this have? Hence what he said is incorrect. Twenty-second, the third master asks: If it is not as I have explained, then the words 'also like this' should have a qualification, because you do not allow analogising the sustaining of all seeds.