成唯識論述記 3.620

3.620

述曰：此即第二論主反質，過去、未來汝執實有，可許非斷，未來續故，與我不同。如何過去說恒有？故不是常義。前言我宗斷，不成緣起理，今汝既是常，常豈緣生理。

The Commentary states: This is the second: the author of the Treatise questions them in return. You hold that past and future are real existents; one may grant "not discontinuous" because the future continues, which differs from me. But how can the past be said to exist constantly? Hence it is not the meaning of "not permanent." Earlier you said my school entails discontinuity and fails to establish the principle of dependent origination; now, since yours is permanent, how could what is permanent be the principle of dependent arising?