成唯識論述記 3.633

3.633

述曰：論主反質，即第六也。此為彼部，未來有故，其果之體，未來已有。現在為因之時果已先有，果已先有，何待於因？若果本無，可待因有，果先已有，何待於因？量云：未來果法，應不待因；體已有故；如已生果。因義本欲生果，果有不待於因，因義不成，有果義亦應無。量云：所言果法，應非是果；以先有體故；由如於因。汝所言因，應不是因，先有體故，猶如於果。無因、無果，豈離斷、常？言我不離，汝豈離耶？初隨返質，唯難於常，今隨雙難，亦破於斷。

The Commentary states: The author of the Treatise questions them in return, which is the sixth. This is addressed to that school: because the future exists, the substance of its fruit already exists in the future. At the time of being a cause in the present, the fruit already previously exists; if the fruit already previously exists, why depend on a cause? If the fruit were originally non-existent, it might depend on a cause to exist; but if the fruit already exists, why depend on a cause? The syllogism is: The future fruit-dharma should not depend on a cause; because its substance already exists; just like an already-arisen fruit. The meaning of a cause is originally to produce a fruit; if the fruit exists without depending on a cause, the meaning of a cause is not established, and the meaning of having a fruit should also be non-existent. The syllogism is: What is called a fruit-dharma should not be a fruit; because its substance previously exists; just like the cause. What you call a cause should not be a cause; because its substance previously exists; just like the fruit. Without cause and without fruit, how could one be free from discontinuity and permanence? You say I am not free from them—how could you be free from them? At first, in answering with a counter-question, he only challenged permanence; now, following up with a dual challenge, he also refutes discontinuity.